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RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 


Baron  S.  A.  Korff,  D.  C.  L. 


Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace 
division  of  international  law 
confidential  print 


Pamphlet  Series  of  the 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace 

Division  of  International  Law 

Confidential  Print 


RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 


BY 

Baron  S.  A.  Korff,  D.  C.  L. 

Professor  of  Political  Science  and  History  in  the  School  of  Foreign  Service, 

Georgetoivn   University,  and  Sometime  Professor  of  Russian  Laiv 

and  History  in  the   University  of  Helsingfors  and 

Women's  University  of  Petrograd 


WASHINGTON 

PUBLISHED  BY  THE  ENDOWMENT 

1921 


COKVRIGHT     I92I 

BY  THE 

CARNEGIE    ENDOWMENT    FOR    INTERNATIONAL    PEACE 


GIBBON  BROS  ,  INC..   PRINTERS.   WASHINGTON 


£^  k 


NOTE 

A  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Armament  was  called  on 
August  11,  1921,  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  to 
meet  in  Washington  on  November  11,  1921,  the  third  anni- 
versary of  the  signing  of  the  armistice  between  the  victorious 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers  and  Germany. 

The  representatives  of  the  Powers  originally  invited  to  the 
Conference  were  the  British  Empire,  France,  Italy  and  Japan, 
for  the  consideration  of  the  question  of  the  limitation  of  arma- 
ment, and  China  for  the  discussion  of  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern 
Questions.  Later,  representatives  of  Belgium,  the  Netherlands 
and  Portugal  were  invited  to  take  part  In  the  discussion  of 
questions  concerning  the  Pacific. 

The  tentative  program  agreed  upon  embraces  the  following 
subjects : 

Limitation  of  Armament 

1.  Limitation  of  naval  armament,  under  which  shall  be  discussed: 

(a)  Basis  of  limitation. 

(b)  Extent. 

{c)    Fulfillment. 

2.  Rules  for  control  of  new  agencies  of  warfare. 

3.  Limitation  of  land  armament. 

Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  Questions 

1.  Questions  relating  to  China. 
First:  Principles  to  be  applied. 
Second :  Application. 

Subjects : 

(a)  Territorial  integrity. 

(b)  Administrative  integrity. 

(c)  Open  door — equality  of  commercial  and  industrial  opportunity. 

(d)  Concessions,  monopolies  or  preferential  economic  privileges. 

(e)  Development  of  railways,  including  plans  relating  to  Chinese 

Eastern  Railway. 
(/)    Preferential  railroad  rates. 
(g)    Status  of  existing  commitments. 

2.  Siberia  (similar  headings). 

3.  Mandated  islands   (unless  questions  earlier  settled). 
Electrical  communications  in  the  Pacific. 


VI  NOTE 

Under  the  heading  of  "Status  of  Existing  Commitments"  it  is  expected 
that  opportunity  will  be  afforded  to  consider  and  to  reach  an  understanding 
with  respect  to  unsettled  questions  involving  the  nature  and  scope  of  com- 
mitments under  which  claims  of  rights  may  hereafter  be  asserted. 

In  the  belief  that  the  dissemination  of  information  regarding 
the  status  of  armaments,  the  collection  of  official  documents 
throwing  light  upon  the  situation  in  the  Pacific,  and  the  furnish- 
ing of  accurate  accounts  of  the  issues  involved  in  some  of  the 
more  important  problems  confronting  the  Conference,  would 
render  a  service  to  the  public  and  perhaps  even  to  the  delegates 
to  the  Conference,  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International 
Peace  has  undertaken  the  preparation  and  publication  of  a  series 
of  pamphlets  of  which  the  present  pamphlet  is  one. 

The  meeting  of  so  many  nations  in  conference,  following  upon 
the  close  of  a  great  war,  is  in  itself  an  event  of  no  mean  import- 
ance. The  holding  of  a  conference  upon  the  limitation  of  arma- 
ment in  succession  to  the  First  Hague  Peace  Conference  called 
to  consider  the  burden  of  armaments  and  the  means  for  its  de- 
crease, with  the  possibility  of  an  agreement  in  conference  upon 
some  of  the  questions  of  international  import  in  addition  to 
armaments,  is  an  indication  that  the  world  is  returning  to  "nor- 
malcy" and  turning  to  the  experience  of  The  Hague. 

That  the  Conference  may  be  successful  In  all  the  phases  of  its 
program  should  be  the  desire  of  men  and  women  of  good-will 
in  all  parts  of  the  world. 

James  Brown  Scott, 

Director. 

Washington,  D.  C, 

October  31.  1921. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

I.   Penetration  into  Siberia I 

II.    Relations  with  China 7 

III.   Relations  with  Japan 20 

IV.   Relations  with  Mongolia 33 

V.  Present  Outlook   38 


RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

I.    Penetration  into  Siberia 

Slow,  but  very  steady,  was  the  advance  of  Russia  into  Siberia. 
For  centuries  did  the  Russians  move  onward,  gradually  driving 
back,  conquering  or  assimilating  the  Mongolian  aborigines.  For 
a  very  long  time  Siberia  seemed  only  a  vast  wilderness  and  a 
happy  hunting  ground  for  the  fur  trader  and  trapper.  Later, 
and  mainly  on  account  of  its  great  distance  from  European  Russia, 
the  Siberian  country  was  used  by  the  czars  for  purposes  of  penal 
colonization.  Thus,  there  grew  up  that  sad  reputation,  which 
clung  to  Siberia  for  many  generations,  of  a  bleak  land  of  exile, 
where  human  suffering  attained  its  very  limit.  The  famous  book 
of  George  Kennan,  Siberia  and  the  Exile  System,  helped  much  to 
popularize  these  ideas,  bringing  home  to  the  outside  world  the 
worst  sides  of  the  former  autocratic  regime  of  Russia. 

Yet  this  conception  of  Siberia  is  a  very  wrong  one.  Behind 
and  around  the  penal  settlements  there  developed  a  most  healthy 
colonization  by  some  of  the  best  types  of  Russian  Slavs.  The 
peasant  of  European  Russia  was  attracted  by  the  fertile  soil  and 
agricultural  resources  and  possibilities  of  Siberia  and  by  the  rela- 
tive individual  independence  of  his  political  and  social  life  there; 
so  he  willingly  migrated  eastward,  taking  possession  of  the  fertile 
land  and  forests  he  could  find.  But  very  naturally,  such  a  pioneer 
movement  called  forth  the  selection  of  the  best  type  of  individuals, 
the  most  enterprising,  most  energetic  and  intellectually  alert 
citizens,  who  thus  soon  constituted  in  Siberia  a  very  progressive 
and  flourishing  population  of  settlers.  Then,  too,  political 
exiles  were  nearly  always  the  pick  of  the  Russian  educated  classes, 
carrying  away  with  them  into  the  wilderness  such  an  amount  of 
intellectual  energy  that,  toward  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, many  Siberian  Provinces  could  boast  of  having  the  best  in- 
tellectually developed  elements  of  the  Russian  nation.  It  is 
important  to  note  in  this  respect,  that  racially  the  Siberian  set- 


I  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

tiers  belonged  all,  or  nearly  all,  to  the  purely  Russian  stock;  only 
among  the  political  exiles  do  we  find  a  small  percentage  of  Poles 
and  of  other  nationalities,  sent  out  after  the  Polish  insurrections 
of  1831  and  1863.  The  Mongolian,  Tartar  and  Finnish  abori- 
gines were  and  remained  mostly  nomads,  of  a  low  type  of  culture, 
and  never  succeeded  in  Influencing  the  Russian  colonists  either 
culturally  or  politically. 

The  hardships  of  life  in  Siberia  quickly  taught  the  local  popu- 
lation self-reliance  and  self-confidence,  strengthening  the  indi- 
vidual will  and  character,  adding.  In  other  words,  just  those  traits 
that  were  conspicuously  lacking  among  the  Russians  In  the  West. 
Since  the  Siberian  territory  was  so  unusually  spacious,  there 
always  remained  sufl'iclent  room  for  further  expansion.  The 
local  population,  outside  the  penal  colonies,  could  move  about 
freely  In  all  directions,  choosing  the  best  location  and  richest  land 
for  their  farms.  There  was  no  land-lordism  nor  any  local  aris- 
tocracy to  hamper  their  movements  or  restrict  their  freehold. 
The  government  administration  for  many  reasons  was  not  Inter- 
fering much  with  their  Individual  life,  tolerating  thus  the  estab- 
lishment and  development  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  local 
autonomy  and  self-government.  All  this  naturally  tended  to 
create  a  remarkably  prosperous,  but  also  individualistic  and 
liberty-loving  type  of  citizen,  which  soon  crystallized  into  a  very 
Independent  class  of  people,  thoroughly  Russian  in  their  culture 
and  way  of  thinking,  yet  Siberian  In  their  self-reliance  and  love  of 
their  homes  and  of  their  personal  freedom. 

Finally,  one  must  mention  the  fabulous  natural  wealth  and  re- 
sources of  Siberia,  superior  in  some  respects  to  the  American  and 
Canadian  West  of  the  former  pioneer  days.  On  the  Siberian 
plains  there  grows  the  finest  wheat  and  barley  of  the  world.  The 
virgin  Siberian  prairies  are  wonderfully  suited  for  cattle  grazing; 
in  some  places  In  addition  there  have  been  started  extensive  cul- 
tures of  alfalfa.  Some  of  the  Siberian  districts  have  vast  forests, 
with  splendid  timber,  still  untouched  by  human  hand.  The  Altai 
mountain  range  is  well  known  for  its  mineral  wealth,  including 
most  of  the  precious  metals,  and  gold  is  found  in  many  of  the 
eastern  river  deposits. 


PENETRATION  INTO  SIBERIA  3 

Across  the  whole  country  there  flow  numerous  navigable 
streams,  forming  easy  and  natural  ways  of  communication  be- 
tween the  different  parts  of  the  Siberian  Provinces.  There  is 
unfortunately  one  great  impediment  in  this  respect,  namely,  most 
of  these  rivers  run  from  south  to  north.  Consequently,  for  a 
long  time  Siberia  was  in  great  need  of  lines  of  communication 
going  west-east,  and  this  need  forcibly  and  materially  handicapped 
the  normal  commercial  development  of  the  country.  This  urgent 
necessity  was  ultimately  met  by  the  construction  of  the  Great 
Siberian  Railway,  which  gave  Siberia  a  most  important  outlet  to 
European  Russia  in  the  West  and  the  Pacific  Ocean  in  the  East. 
The  significance  of  this  new  channel  of  communications  and  the 
role  it  was  bound  to  play  can  be  judged  by  the  stupendous  develop- 
ment of  the  Siberian  economical  resources  that  took  place  from 
the  very  first  days  the  cross-country  railway  was  opened  for  com- 
mercial trafllic. 

"Siberia,"  or  the  vast  Asiatic  possessions  of  Russia,  lying  east 
of  the  Ural  Mountains,  is  really  composed  of  two  very  different 
parts,  first,  the  endless  plains  which  lie  between  the  Urals  and  the 
Lake  Baikal,  and,  secondly,  the  Far  Eastern  Provinces,  located 
east  of  the  Baikal.  These  two  sections  are  divergent  in  more 
ways  than  one;  they  differ  topographically,  economically,  socially 
and  even  politically,  and  are  bound  to  constitute  in  the  future 
separate  political  units.  The  Western  Provinces  are,  and  always 
will  remain,  overwhelmingly  agricultural,  wheat-growing  land, 
dotted  here  and  there  with  magnificent  timber.  But  in  turn,  they 
are  divided  into  two  groups  of  Provinces,  one  northern  one,  the 
other  one  southern,  without  much  contrast  between  them.  The 
four  Northern  Provinces,  Tobolsk,  Tomsk,  Yeniseisk  and 
Irkutsk,  constitute  "Siberia  proper"  and  are  at  present  the  best 
developed  section,  with  a  steady  rural  population  of  thrifty  and 
prosperous  Russian  colonists.  The  Southern  Provinces,  or 
"Steppe  country,"  Semipalatinsk,  Semiretchinsk  and  Akmolinsk, 
though  possessing  also  tremendous  natural  resources,  are  much 
less  mature,  mostly  on  account  of  the  lack  of  railway  communi- 
cations, since  the  Central  Siberian  Railway  has  not  enough  south- 
ern branches  to  satisfy  their  growing  needs.     All  these  Provinces, 


4  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

in  the  north  as  well  as  in  the  south,  are  colonized  by  purely  Rus- 
sian stock,  with  very  few  and  insignificant  exceptions,  and  are 
predominantly  farmers,  while  the  penal  colonization  is  numeri- 
cally small  among  them.  The  nomad  aborigines  are  disappear- 
ing very  fast  and  those  of  them  who  succeed  in  settling  down  ac- 
quire, without  any  difficulty,  the  Russian  culture  and  modes  of 
social  and  political  life.  In  most  places  they  were  permitted  to 
retain  their  local  tribal  organizations,  and  the  most  conspicuous 
among  them  are  the  Kirgiz  tribes,  who  stand  far  above  the  other 
nomads  in  culture  and  political  maturity. 

The  colonization  of  the  second  or  eastern  part  of  Siberia  pro- 
ceeded from  the  beginning  on  very  different  lines,  first,  for  purely 
topographical  reasons,  and  secondly,  because  of  the  distance  that 
separated  this  section  of  the  country  from  European  Russia,  in- 
tensified by  the  long  continuance  of  utter  lack  of  communication 
with  the  outside  world.  It  is  in  these  regions  that  we  find  con- 
centrated the  mineral  wealth  of  Siberia  and  it  was  here  in  the 
mine  fields  that  the  Tsar's  Government  settled  many  of  the  penal 
and  political  exiles;  they  were  to  work  the  mines  and  live  as  far 
away  from  Russia  as  possible.  Very  naturally  these  settlements 
developed  on  quite  different  social  and  political  lines  from  the 
agricultural  colonies  of  the  Western  Siberian  Provinces;  their 
economic  conditions  of  life  were  also  quite  distinct  from  the 
West.  The  steady  eastward  movement  of  the  Russians  brought 
them  finally  out  to  the  Pacific  and  there  they  soon  formed  a  com- 
mercial fringe  of  settlements  along  that  coast,  of  an  entirely 
divergent  character  from  the  rest  of  Siberia. 

The  process  of  colonization  of  Eastern  Siberia  reminds  one 
very  much  of  the  development  of  the  American  Pacific  coast, 
when  for  a  long  time  California  was  separated  from  the  Middle 
West  and  Eastern  States  by  the  wilderness  of  the  Rocky  Moun- 
tains. In  many  other  ways,  too,  the  American  movement  west- 
ward developed  on  similar  lines  to  those  of  Russia  in  Siberia, 
except  that  in  the  United  States  these  processes  of  pioneer  ex- 
pansion had  always  a  much  more  intense  and  potent  character 
than  the  similar  processes  of  Russian  colonizatioin  of  her  Eastern 
Siberian  frontiers.  One  of  the  more  important  causes  that  con- 
stantly hampered  the  Russian  colonization  movement,  as  com- 


PENETRATION  INTO  SIBERIA  D 

pared  with  America,  was  her  inefficient  autocratic  form  of  gov- 
ernment. Another  reason  for  her  lagging  behind  was  the  pres- 
ence in  Eastern  Siberia  of  the  penal  colonies,  which  naturally 
could  not  take  a  full  share  in  the  economic  development  of  the 
country. 

Eastern  Siberia  is  composed  of  four  Provinces  and  two  sepa- 
rate Districts,  the  Transbaikal,  Amur,  Maritime  and  Yakutsk 
Provinces  and  the  Kamchatka  and  Sakhaline  Districts.  The 
Transbaikal  Province  is  rich  in  minerals  and  has  a  numerous 
Cossack  and  Buriat  population,  racially  in  many  cases  intermixed, 
as  well  as  many  of  the  penal  settlements.  The  Maritime  Prov- 
ince, with  Vladivostok  as  its  capital,  is  on  the  contrary  over- 
whelmingly commercial;  it  is  the  Russian  California.  Yakutsk 
and  the  vast  territory  of  the  Kamchatka  Peninsula  are  yet  very 
sparsely  populated,  though  possessing  important  natural  re- 
sources, promising  mines,  splendid  fisheries  and  a  huge  supply  of 
fur-bearing  animals.  The  Island  of  Sakhaline  is  also  rich  in 
mines,  coal  and  timber.  The  southern  half  of  the  Island  was  lost 
to  Russia,  by  the  terms  of  the  Portsmouth  Peace  Treaty,  which 
ceded  it  to  Japan.  At  present  the  Japanese  seem  to  have  taken 
definite  possession  of  the  northern  half  of  the  Island  as  well. 

In  considering  the  history  of  Siberian  colonization  one  comes 
to  the  following  conclusions :  First,  that  Siberia,  taken  as  a  whole, 
has  an  exceptionally  potential  economic  future,  on  account  of  its 
tremendous  natural  wealth.  It  is  a  land  of  great  promise,  mar- 
velously  rich,  though  hardly  yet  exploited  to  the  limit  of  its  possi- 
bilities. Secondly,  Siberia  consists  to  two  very  different  parts, 
which  are  bound  to  constitute  two  distinct  political  units.  On  the 
one  hand,  there  are  the  Western  and  Southern  Provinces,  over- 
whelmingly agricultural,  with  a  population  of  thrifty  peasant 
farmers,  an  extremely  individualistic,  self-reliant  and  liberty-lov- 
ing people,  and  in  the  main,  with  distinctly  conservative  leanings. 
These  settlers  own  their  land  and  are  very  jealous  of  their  free- 
hold, interested  in  local  self-government,  as  long  as  the  latter 
concerns  their  village  or  county,  but  not  caring  much  for  the  out- 
side world,  as  long  as  they  can  get  a  good  profit  from  their  agri- 
cultural products.  The  cooperative  movement  in  all  its  forms  is 
very  strong  among  these  Siberian  peasants  and  has  achieved  re- 


6  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

markable  economic  and  to  some  extent  even  political  results. 
The  Eastern  or  P'ar  Eastern  Provinces,  on  the  other  hand,  possess 
very  different  characteristics,  commerce  and  industry  visibly  domi- 
nating. There  exists,  too,  in  these  latter  Provinces  a  much 
stronger  racial  intercourse  with  non-Russian  nationalities,  which 
necessarily  influenced  the  life  and  character  of  the  Russian  colo- 
nists. 

These  important  differences  lead  to  a  third  weighty  conclusion, 
the  different  political  status  which  these  two  sections  of  Siberia 
are  bound  to  maintain  in  the  future  Russian  Commonwealth. 
Whereas  Western  Siberia  will  be  perfectly  content  with  firmly 
established  local  self-government  (for  instance,  some  form  of 
well  developed  zemstvo  organization),  provided  economic  and 
financial  independence  from  the  center  would  be  efliciently  guar- 
anteed, the  Eastern  section  will  demand  much  more  and  will 
surely  endeavor  to  curtail  the  powers  of  the  Central  Government 
to  a  possible  minimum. 

The  population  of  Siberia  can  be  roughly  divided  into  the  fol- 
lowing groups.  The  main  body  of  inhabitants  all  over  the  coun- 
try, constituting  the  vast  numerical  majority,  are  everywhere,  ex- 
cept in  the  extreme  East,  farmer-settlers  of  the  peasant  class  of 
purely  Russian  racial  stock.  Not  much  differing  from  them  are 
the  Cossacks,  settled  in  the  Siberian  Provinces  by  government 
order  and  constituting  autonomous,  self-governing  units,  with  a 
semi-military  organization  of  their  own.  The  Transbaikal  and 
Amur  Cossacks,  however,  are  very  much  racially  intermixed  with 
the  local  aborigines  of  Mongolian  origin.  The  West-Siberian 
Cossacks  succeeded  in  preserving  much  better  their  racial  purity. 
Then  there  are  the  numerous  penal  and  political  colonies,  many 
of  them  thriving  and  thrifty.  The  religious  dissenters  among 
them  are  exceptionally  wealthy  and  prosperous,  constituting  prob- 
ably the  best  type  of  the  Siberian  population.  Canada  has  some 
such  colonies,  though  less  numerous  and  less  prosperous  than  the 
Siberian  nonconformists. 

Scattered  among  all  these  Russian  colonies  live  the  Mongolian 
nomads  and  aborigines,  governed  by  their  own  chiefs  and  tribes- 
men, but  under  the  control  of  Russian  authorities.      In  Western 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA  / 

Siberia  they  live  quite  separately  from  the  Russian  population;  in 
the  Eastern  Provinces  they  freely  intermingle.  Further,  there 
is  the  commercial  class  in  the  towns  and  cities,  a  trading  bourge- 
oisie, an  intelligentzia  or  numerically  small  educated  class,  pos- 
sessing all  the  characteristic  traits  of  the  town  population  in  gen- 
eral, but  very  independent  and  self-reliant  in  its  tastes  and  ideas. 
Finally,  in  all  the  larger  Russlansettlemcnts  there  istobe  found  and 
in  always  increasing  numbers  a  scatteredmassofChineseand Mon- 
golians, coming  intoSIberia  from  across  the  frontier,  sometimes 
temporarily,  for  commercial  purposes,  but  only  too  often  with  the 
intention  of  permanently  establishing  themselves  as  local  citizens. 
The  great  differences  mentioned  between  Western  and  East- 
ern Siberia  are  of  modern  origin,  but  constantly  increase  in  poten- 
tial force,  as  time  goes  on.  In  former  days  they  did  not  influ- 
ence the  development  of  the  Russian  Empire,  nor  the  policies  of 
its  Government.  The  latter  did  not  care  about  them,  often  try- 
ing to  frustrate  or  stop  them,  though  without  much  success  on  the 
whole,  and  their  natural  tendencies  described  above  proved  to  be 
stronger  and  of  greater  vitality  than  St.  Petersburg  ever  sus- 
pected. In  the  future  they  are  bound  to  play  a  decisive  role  in 
the  process  of  shaping  the  fate  of  the  Russian  Commonwealth. 

II.    Relations  With  China 

In  the  process  of  Siberian  colonization  Russia  came  very  soon 
and  naturally  into  contact  with  China.  In  the  early  stages,  as 
long  as  the  Russian  settlers  still  kept  west  of  the  Baikal,  relations 
with  China  were  very  cordial,  but  rather  abstract.  Once  in  a 
while  we  hear  of  a  Russian  religious  mission  going  to  China,  or 
of  the  appointment  of  a  consul  or  agent,  intended  to  look  after 
the  mutual  trade  interests,  the  chief  article  of  import  from  China 
always  having  been  Chinese  tea.  This  peaceful  period  lasted 
approximately  till  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,'  when 
unexpectedly  the  whole  situation  entirely  altered. 

'Typical  for  this  period  was  the  Russo-Chinese  treaty  of  Kiakhta,  signed  October 
21,  1727,  which  formed  for  more  than  a  century  the  basis  of  the  mutual  relations 
between  these  two  countries.  The  text  of  this  treaty  can  be  found  in  the  collection 
of  Sir  Edw.  Hertslet,  Trenties,  etc.  het'v:een  Great  Britain  and  China:  and  hrt<v:ri'?i 


8  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

The  great  change  was  called  forth  by  two  new  and  important 
factors.  First,  Russia  began  to  push  energetically  forward,  in- 
vading and  colonizing  the  regions  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Amur 
River;  and  secondly,  other  European  Powers  started  a  lively  com- 
petition for  getting  control  of  the  Chinese  markets  and  in  their 
mutual  rivalry  betrampled  the  most  sacred  rights  of  sovereignty 
and  independence  of  the  Middle  Kingdom.  Russia  unfortu- 
nately played  no  small  role  in  this  diplomatic  game,  which  finally 
led  to  her  own  undoing. 

Up  to  the  fifties,  we  can  find  many  private  and  official  attempts 
on  the  part  of  Russians  to  penetrate  into  the  Far-Eastern  wilder- 
ness, but  mostly  without  any  lasting  results.  There  was  no  sys- 
tem in  these  expeditions  and  all  of  them  failed  to  establish  any 
permanent  cultural  influence.  They  could  conquer,  but  could  not 
colonize  nor  civilize.  They  subdued  the  natives,  without  being 
able  to  enlighten  them.  The  situation  changed  only  in  the  mid- 
dle of  the  nineteenth  century.  At  that  time  Russia  sent  consecu- 
tive military  and  diplomatic  missions  to  China,  wresting  from  the 
latter  some  important  privileges.  Several  treaties  were  signed, 
granting  Russia  most  valuable  advantages. 

Russia  first  signed  a  treaty  of  commerce,  in  order  to  protect 
her  trade  along  the  Chinese  border,  but  especially  concerning  the 
Mongolian  caravan  routes  and  the  recognition  of  freedom  for 
herself  from  all  custom  duties. '  The  importance  of  this  treaty 
lies  in  the  fact,  that  it  formed  the  basis  of  the  claims  of  Russia 
during  the  following  decades.  The  enumeration  of  privileges, 
for  instance,  found  in  the  agreement  of  1851,  was  constantly  re- 
ferred to  later  on  by  the  different  Russian  diplomatic  agents  and 
representatives. 

Secondly,  in  1858,  when  the  Russian  penetration  and  coloniza- 
tion along  the  northern  banks  of  the  Amur  River  had  already 
taken  definite   form,   the  two  countries  signed  a  new  treaty  of 

China  and  Foreign  Poivers,  (London,  1908)  vol.  I;  or  in  the  official  publication  of 
the  Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Recueil  des  Trait-'s  {Sbornik  Traktatof) 
(St.  Petersburg,  1902),  vol.  I.  An  impartial  and  detailed  history  of  the  early  Rus- 
sian expansion  eastward  can  be  found  in  the  volume  of  F.  A.  Colder,  Russian  Ex- 
pansion on  the  Pacific  (Cleveland,  1914). 

'This   is   the    agreement,   known    as   the   Kouldja   Treaty   of  July   25,    1851.     Cf. 
IIertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  p.  305  ;  and  Shornik,  vol.  I,  no.  32,  p.  242. 


RFXATIONS  WITH  CHINA        '  J 

friendship,  delineating  the  frontier  regions  and  p.roclaIming  Rus- 
sian sovereignty  to  the  north  of  that  stream.'  In  other  words, 
from  that  day  on  Russia  was  firmly  established  In  the  F\ir  Eastern 
Provinces,  China  having  lost  all  her  juridical  claims  to  the  terri- 
tories lying  north  of  the  Amur.  A  few  weeks  later  the  Russian 
commercial  privileges  were  restated  and  expanded  to  the  whole 
of  China,  In  an  agreement  signed  at  Tientsin.^  Russia  could 
hence  trade  in  any  open  port  of  China,  not  restricting  herself  as 
previously  to  frontier  places.  She  could  send  envoys  to  Peking, 
appoint  consuls  In  the  open  ports  and  detach  vessels  of  war  to 
protect  them.  Special  mention  was  also  made  of  the  Interests  of 
the  Russian  religious  missions  in  China. 

Not  content  with  this  achievement,  Russia  persuaded  China  to 
sign  a  new  agreement  two  years  later,  once  more  enumerating  the 
privileges  of  the  Russian  agents  and  merchants,  as  well  as  the 
advantages  secured  for  Russian  trade  and  the  extraterritorial 
jurisdiction,''  somewhat  extending  them  and  interpreting  the 
granted  privileges  In  Russia's  favor. 

These  treaties  with  China  which  have  been  enumerated  had 
three  important  consequences  for  Russia.  First,  as  was  pointed 
out  above,  they  finally  and  juridically  established  the  sovereignty 
of  Russia  in  the  new  settled  Provinces  north  of  the  Amur  River 
and  as  far  east  as  the  Pacific.  Russia  thus  reached  her  geogra- 
phic eastern  boundaries  and  found  an  outlet  to  the  sea.  Secondly, 
these  treaties  fundamentally  changed  the  character  of  the  mutual 
relations  of  the  two  countries.  Russia  was  gradually  becoming 
much  more  aggressive  towards  China,  unhesitatingly,  but  sel- 
fishly pursuing  two  main  objects  In  her  new  Far  Eastern  policy, 
viz.,  the  colonization  of  the  Amur  and  Maritime  Provinces  and 
the  securing  of  the  North  China  markets  for  the  benefit  of  the 
Russian  trade. 

^Treaty  of  Aighoun,  May  16,  1858  ;  cf.  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  p.  310;  Sbornik,  no.  33,  p. 
247.  The  demarcation  of  the  Mongolian  boundaries  was  agreed  upon  by  a  special 
conference  in  1864;  cf.  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  p.  329. 

2June  13,  1858;  cf.  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  p.  311;  Sbornik,  no.  34,  p.  249. 

'Treaty  of  Peking,  November  14,  1860;  cf.  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  p.  318;  Sbornik,  no. 
35,  p.  255.  Hertslet  also  publishes  the  text  of  a  revised  convention  for  land  trade, 
signed  in  Peking,  April  27,  1869,  which  is  not  mentioned  in  the  Russian  Sbornik; 
this  convention  restates  the  privileges  of  the  Russian  trade  in  China  and  reaffirms 
all  the  advantages  granted  to  the  Russian  merchants. 


10  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

In  both  cases  she  was  for  the  time  being  completely  successful. 
The  colonization  and  development  of  these  new  Far  Eastern 
Provinces  were  progressing  by  leaps  and  bounds.  Previously, 
the  settlements  east  of  the  Lake  Baikal  were  looked  upon  by  the 
Russian  Government  exclusively  as  penal  colonies,  among  which 
the  political  exiles  played  a  dominant  role;  now,  quite  another 
element  of  settlers  began  to  move  onward,  exploring,  colonizing 
and  consolidating  the  regions  along  the  Amur  and  further  north- 
east. These  Russian  colonists  soon  became  thoroughly  con- 
vinced of  the  tremendous  economic  potentialities  of  this  country, 
as  well  as  of  the  wealth  of  its  natural  resources  and  of  the  ad- 
vantages which  they  could  derive  from  the  exploitation  of  the 
North  China  markets.  In  other  words,  it  suddenly  dawned  upon 
the  Russians,  what  the  opening  up  of  the  Far  East  might  mean 
for  the  future  of  Siberia  and  for  the  whole  of  the  Russian  com- 
merce. The  penal  and  political  colonization  of  the  eastern  wild- 
erness was  thus  soon  transformed  into  a  pioneer  movement,  which 
was  bound  to  mean  a  new  epoch  for  Siberia  and  her  Inhabitants. 

In  order  to  further  consolidate  the  colonization  of  the  Amur 
Province,  the  Russian  Government  continued  settling  there  groups 
of  Cossack  families,  who  were  expected  to  provide  for  the  mili- 
tary defence  of  the  frontiersmen. 

The  climax  of  these  processes  of  colonization  was  attained, 
just  as  in  the  case  of  California,  when  the  Russians  reached  the 
Pacific  coast  and  founded  the  city  of  Vladivostok.  This  was  the 
final  link  of  the  Russian  Empire,  connecting  European  Russia 
through  Siberia  and  the  Far  East  to  the  Pacific  coast.  In  order 
to  help  the  pioneers  to  take  possession  of  the  coast,  the  Russian 
Government  sent  out  warships  for  the  further  exploration  of  the 
Eastern  Pacific  and  for  the  protection  of  the  young  colonies  there; 
and  naval  commanders  were  duly  instructed  to  hoist  the  Russian 
flag  in  the  most  suitable  harbors  along  the  coast,  thus  establishing 
and  supporting  the  claims  of  sovereignty  of  the  Russian  Empire. 

The  offensive  character  of  the  Russian  policy  toward  China 
described  above  can  be  explained  by  its  chief  object  of  securing 
the  North  China  markets  for  the  Russian  merchants.  It  coin- 
cided exactly  with  the  aggressiveness  of  the  Western  Powers  in 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA  11 

the  South,  but  with  this  evident  difference,  that  Russian  aggres- 
sion, as  proved  conclusively  by  the  contents  of  the  cited  treaties, 
had  mainly  the  so-called  "Land  Trade"  in  view,  and,  more- 
over, concerned  Provinces  and  districts  of  relatively  little  in- 
terest to  China.  Both  Mongolia  and  northern  Manchuria  were 
only  sparsely  populated,  mostly  by  backward  Mongolian  tribes, 
far  distant  from  the  center  and  unimportant  from  the  political 
point  of  view,  whereas  the  European  invasion  took  place  in  the 
very  heart  of  China,  making  use  of  her  great  weakness  during  and 
after  the  unhappy  Tai-Ping  rebellion  and  taking  advantage  in  the 
political  field  by  undermining  the  principles  of  Chinese  sover- 
eignty. 

Thus  can  be  explained  the  seemingly  strange  fact,  that  in  some 
cases  Peking  was  quite  ready  to  cooperate  with  St.  Petersburg  in 
the  development  of  the  Northern  Provinces  by  Russians,  because, 
first,  the  Chinese  realized  the  advantages  which  could  accrue  to 
their  country  from  the  successful  opening  up  of  these  new  regions, 
and  secondly,  they  hoped  to  find,  and  several  times  did  find,  sup- 
port in  Russia  against  the  other  Powers.  In  other  words,  the 
Peking  Government  was  at  times  during  that  period  a  willing 
victim  of  Russia's  Far  Eastern  expansion  and  was  lending  a 
friendly  hand  to  the  further  unfolding  of  the  Chinese  relations 
with  the  Empire  of  the  Czars.  For  the  time  being  a  certain 
equilibrium  was  established  in  the  mutual  relations  of  these  two 
neighboring  empires,  Russia  Intent  on  the  consolidation  of  her 
colonization  along  the  Amur  River,  China  content  with  the  In- 
creasing trade  on  the  Russian  frontier. 

In  1881  a  new  treaty  was  signed  by  Russia  and  China  under  the 
pretext  of  the  former  country  returning  to  the  latter  the  Province 
of  III,  which  the  Russians  had  occupied  since  1871,  but  securing 
for  Russia  an  Indemnity  of  nine  million  gold  rubles.'  This  how- 
ever was  a  blind,  back  of  which  we  find  important  privileges  once 
more   reaffirmed   to   Russia's   advantage.     Namely,   again   they 

'Treaty  of  St.  Petersburg  of  February  24,  1881;  cf.  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  p.  340; 
Sbornik,  no.  36,  p.  264.  The  history  of  the  transactions  preceding  the  signature  of 
the  Treaty  of  1881  is  given  in  detail  by  H.  Cordier,  Histoire  des  relations  de  la 
Chine   (Paris,  1902),  vol.  ii,  ch.  ix-xii. 


12  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

concerned  the  questions  of  land  trade,  the  trade  routes,  consul- 
ates, custom  tariffs,  etc.,  enumerated  in  detail  in  a  separate  un- 
derstanding (called  Rrglement),  attached  to  this  treaty.  Thus 
matters  stood  for  fifteen  years,  when  much  more  serious  troubles 
started  for  distracted  China  and  when  a  new  and  formidable 
competitor  appeared  in  the  Far  East  in  the  person  of  Japan. 

Meanwhile,  Russia,  having  by  this  time  achieved  a  marked  suc- 
cess in  her  colonization  of  the  newly  acquired  Provinces,  began 
to  turn  her  attention  much  farther  South,  namely,  toward  Man- 
churia proper  and  the  Kingdom  of  Korea.  Already  in  the  eight- 
ies there  had  arisen  a  certain  friction  concerning  Korea,  England 
having  occupied  but  later  evacuated  the  Islands  of  Port  Hamil- 
ton, and  Russia  having  increased  her  influence  at  the  Court  of 
Seoul.  Worse  was  to  come,  however,  after  the  defeat  of  China 
in  1895.  The  intention  of  victorious  Japan  was  to  establish  per- 
manently her  control  over  Korea,  which  was  hence  entirely  and 
forever  lost  to  China,  and  it  was  here,  in  Korea,  that  the  first 
clash  came  between  Japan  and  Russia. 

By  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  Shimonoseki,^  China  was  forced  to 
cede  to  Japan  the  Liaotung  peninsula,  with  the  splendid  fortress 
of  Port  Arthur,  and  was  made  to  pay  a  heavy  indemnity,  with  no 
money  in  her  treasury  to  meet  this  obligation.  And  it  was  that 
moment  of  hopeless  weakness  that  the  European  Powers  chose 
to  take  final  hold  of  the  Chinese  markets.  It  was  to  be  accom- 
plished by  loaning  China  money,  with  which  she  could  pay  her 
indemnity  to  Japan,  and  by  forcing  the  latter  to  disgorge  some 
of  her  territorial  acquisitions,  namely,  Liaotung  and  Port  Arthur. 

The  first  hint  of  this  new  policy  came  from  China's  most  trusted 
counselor,  Sir  Robert  Hart,  who  informed  the  Peking  Govern- 
ment that  England,  for  certain  considerations,  was  willing  to 
float  a  loan  which  would  enable  China  to  pay  the  Japanese  in- 
demnity. Considering  the  straits  in  which  the  Peking  Govern- 
ment was  laboring  at  the  time,  it  was  welcome  news  for  it. 
But  as  soon  as  the  rumors  of  such  an  offer  spread  abroad,  the 
other  Powers  naturally  endeavored  to  do  the  same  thing.     Russia, 

'English  translation  in  J.  V.  A.  MacMurray,  Treaties  and  Agreements  I'/ith  and 
coniertiing  China,  Jc9J-1919  (New  York,  1921),  vol.  i,  p.  18. 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA  13 

backed  by  France,  also  volunteered  a  loan,  which  China,  after 
some  hesitation,  also  accepted.  Germany  followed,  and  so  the 
ball  was  started  rolling,  enslaving  China  to  the  European  Gov- 
ernments by  this  subtle  means  of  financial  assistance.  All  the 
loans  were  to  be  covered  by  the  income  derived  from  Chinese 
customs,  taxes  on  salt  and  the  Likin  tax. 

Having  accomplished  this,  the  European  Governments  realized 
that  the  consequent  exploitation  of  the  Chinese  markets  could 
progress  favorably  only  on  condition  of  building  up  the  necessary 
lines  of  transportation.  Thus,  there  started  a  feverish  activity 
for  acquiring  railroad  concessions  and  using  them  for  political 
purposes  as  well.^ 

At  that  time  there  stood  at  the  head  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment a  careful  and  far-sighted  statesman,  who  realized  very  well 
the  predicament  of  his  poor  country  and  that  it  could  not  do 
without  the  support  of  a  friendly  European  Power.  Accord- 
ingly, Li  Hung-Chang  chose  Russia  for  this  role;  and  during  his 
whole  career  of  government  leadership  he  tried  to  base  his  policy 
on  Russian  friendship  and  support,  bringing  upon  himself  accu- 
sations of  all  sorts  of  crimes  and  immorality,  none  of  which  were 
ever  proved.  This  friendly  policy  of  Li  toward  Russia  became 
evident  even  during  the  Shimonoseki  transactions.  Returning  to 
Peking,  after  having  signed  the  Treaty  of  Peace  with  Japan,  he 
at  once  started  conversations  with  the  Russian  representatives 
relating  to  concerted  action  in  their  mutual  foreign  policy  and 
promising  Russia  new  advantages  in  Eastern  Siberia. 

His  Peking  conversations  soon  became  noised  abroad,  creating 
a  great  sensation.  Local  newspapers,  the  North  China  Herald 
among  others,  got  hold  of  these  rumors  and  published,  in  October, 
1896,  an  account  of  a  supposed  secret  agreement,  subsequently 
known  as  the  Cassini  Convention,  bearing  the  name  of  the  Rus- 
sian Minister  to  Peking,  Count  Cassini.'*     As  a  matter  of  fact  no 

^The  enumeration  and  details  of  these  loan-agreements,  1894-1896,  can  be  found 
in  MacMurray,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i ;  cf.  also  W.  W.  Willoughby,  Foreign  Rights  and  In- 
terests in  China   (Baltimore,  1920). 

^Cf.  MacMurray,  op.  cit.,  and  Willoughby,  op.  cit. 

^It  is  often  quoted  by  historians  and  politicians,  though  H.  Cordier  in  his  Histoire 
des  relations  de  la  Chine,  has  long  ago  pointed  out  the  vagueness  and  incoherence 
of  t!ie  newspaper  text. 


14  RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA 

such  convention  ever  existed.  The  Peking  conversations  of  Li 
with  Cassini  were  only  a  part,  and  probably  the  least  important 
one,  of  the  secret  diplomatic  intercourse  between  Russia  and 
China;  much  more  momentous  transactions  took  place  in  St. 
Petersburg  and  Berlin,  during  the  voyage  of  Li  Hung-Chang 
abroad,  in  the  preceding  winter  and  spring.  The  newspaper  text, 
on  the  whole  seems  to  be  a  vague  and  confusing  combination  of 
the  gist  of  several  agreements,  the  bank  and  railway  concessions 
and  partly  the  alliance  of  May,  1896,  all  of  them  concluded  in  the 
foregoing  months  of  Li's  travels  in  Europe. 

He  had  been  commissioned  by  his  government  to  go  to  Russia 
and  represent  China  at  the  Tsar's  coronation.  In  consequence, 
foreseeing  the  necessity  of  an  amicable  understanding  with 
Russia,  Li  carefully  paved  his  way  in  the  political  situation.  He 
knew  that  Russia  was  just  then  turning  over  a  leaf  in  her  Far 
Eastern  policy.  He  realized  that  the  period  of  Russian  coloniza- 
tion was  now  shifting  into  a  policy  of  expansion,  and  he  cleverly 
made  preparations  to  meet  Russia  half  way  and  cooperate  with 
her,  making  ceratin  concessions  to  her  and  staying  her  impossible 
demands,  but  all  with  the  one  main  purpose  in  mind  of  finding  in 
Russia  an  ally  capable  of  assisting  him  in  warding  off  the  aggres- 
sion of  the  other  Powers,  whom  Li,  as  has  been  said,  feared  much 
more  than  his  northern  neighbor.  As  soon  as  Li  reached  St. 
Petersburg,  diplomatic  conversations  with  him  were  at  once 
started  by  the  Russian  Government,  pursuing  three  parallel  ob- 
jects, the  securing  of  two  concessions  and  a  friendly  alliance. 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  political  situation  of  those  days,  we 
must  bear  in  mind  the  composition  and  policies  of  the  govern- 
ment which  Li  found  on  his  arrival  in  St.  Petersburg.  At  the 
head  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  during  those  days  was  a  very 
strong  and  exceedingly  energetic  statesman,  S.  J.  Witte,  who  had 
set  his  mind  on  the  development  of  the  Far  Eastern  markets  of 
Russia,  considering  them  to  be  a  most  profitable  opening  for  the 
young  Russian  industry  and  a  means  of  exploiting  Siberia  through 
the  just  completed  cross-country  railroad.  Witte  thought,  and 
very  rightly  so,  that  the  outlet  to  the  Pacific  would  be  a  tremend- 
ous stimulus  for  the  commercial  and  industrial  development  of 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA  15 

Siberia  and  prove  of  no  small  advantage  even  to  the  Industries  of 
European  Russia.  Having  these  objects  in  view,  he  endeavored 
to  get  Li  Hung-Chang  to  agree  to  grant  Russia  two  concessions, 
one  concerning  a  bank,  the  other  relating  to  the  construction  of 
a  railway  across  Manchuria.  After  some  bickering  on  both  sides 
these  ends  were  attained. 

Witte  then  started,  with  the  help  of  French  bankers,  a  Russo- 
Chinese  bank,  with  a  capital  of  11)4  million  rubles  and  5  mil- 
lion taels.  The  president  was  to  be  a  Chinese  figurehead,  but 
the  active  managers  were  Russians,  working  under  the  direction 
of  Witte.'  This  bank  was  meant  to  carry  out  Witte's  policy  of 
peaceful  penetration  of  Northern  China,  exploit  the  Manchurian 
market  and  establish  the  Russian  political  influence  in  the  Far 
East.  But  it  was  also  meant  to  finance  Witte's  plans  of  railroad 
construction.  The  Siberian  main  line  had  just  reached  the  Baikal 
Lake  and  now  was  to  be  continued  farther,  following  the  north- 
ern bend  of  the  Amur  River.  Witte  had  conceived  the  plan  of 
leasing  from  China  a  strip  of  territory  across  Manchuria  in  order 
to  construct  the  Siberian  railroad  in  a  straight  line  to  Vladivostok 
instead  of  building  it  along  the  northern  curve  of  the  Amur.  It 
shortened  the  railroad  considerably,  but  at. the  same  time  gave 
the  Russians  a  firm  grip  on  the  Manchurian  market.  From  the 
middle  of  Northern  Manchuria  Witte  planned  to  build  another 
line  south  to  Port  Arthur,  with  a  branch  south-westward  to 
Shanhaikwan,  securing  for  Russia  in  addition  to  the  Manchurian 
market,  a  second  outlet  to  the  Pacific. 

It  was  an  elaborate  and  clever  program,  intended  to  establish 
an  extensive  system  of  peaceful  penetration.  Unfortunately, 
the  peaceful  aims  of  Witte  were  later  on  overshadowed  by  mili- 
.taristic  and  imperialistic  designs  of  other  Russian  Ministers.  It 
is  a  very  usual  case,  when  the  military  elements  are  tempted  to  get 
control  of  the  foreign  expansion  policy  of  a  government. 

The  second  agreement,  concerning  the  described  plans  of  rail- 
road construction,  was  finally  signed  on  September  8,  1896,  and 
curiously  enough  in  Berlin.-     There  is  good  reason  to  believe  that 

'August-September,  1896.     Cf.  MacMurray,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  74. 
'Cf.  MacMurray,  ibid. 


16  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Witte's  policy  toward  China  was  not  only  well  known  in  Germany 
but  that  much  of  its  inspiration  came  Berlin.  Germany 
then  was  playing  a  sure  game,  realizing  very  well  Russia's  inter- 
nal weakness;  heads  she  won,  tails  Russia  lost.  The  German 
Government  was  not  averse  to  seeing  Russia  become  entangled  in 
the  Far  East.  The  more  she  was  involved  in  the  Chinese  trouble, 
the  less  she  was  able  to  participate  in  European  questions  and 
support  her  Western  ally,  France.  The  latter  country,  on  the 
contrary,  was  actuated  by  purely  financial  considerations  in  back- 
ing the  Russian  Far  Eastern  policy.  The  Paris  bankers  thought 
it  was  a  good  investment  for  French  capital,  and  willingly  loaned 
Witte  the  money  necessary  to  start  the  Bank,  and  for  the  rail- 
way construction. 

The  Russian  Government,  however,  was  not  content  to  stop 
there.  Simultaneously  with  the  transactions  concerning  the  two 
concessions,  the  Russians  were  conducting  with  Li  purely  political 
conversations  as  well  during  the  spring  of  1896,  and  in  absolute 
secrecy  convinced  him  of  the  necessity  of  signing  a  treaty  of  alli- 
ance, which  was  directed  against  China's  dreaded  enemy,  Japan. i 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  Article  I  Japanese  expansion  in 
Korea  is  also  mentioned,  parallel  to  any  possible  aggression  on 
her  part  in  China  or  Russia,  as  a  casus  foederis.  The  other 
articles  describe  in  detail  the  possible  military  cooperation  of  the 
two  Contracting  Powers  in  case  of  a  war  with  Japan.  In  Article 
IV  is  found  a  clear  reference  to  the  possibility  of  Russia  building 
a  railway  across  Manchuria,  but  with  this  difference:  in  May, 
1896,  Russia  stipulated  such  a  construction  only  in  case  of  war, 
whereas  in  September  of  the  same  year  China  agreed  that  Russia 
should  build  the  line  immediately  in  any  case. 

Such  were  the  three  ominous  agreements  signed  by  Russia  and 
China  in  the  course  of  1896.  It  speedily  became  evident,  how- 
ever, that  Russia  was  even  then  not  satisfied  to  remain  where  she 
was  and  started  a  further  expansion  southward,  trying  to  lay  a 
hand  on  Korea  too.  Russian  agents  appeared  in  numbers  at 
Seoul  and  Russian  officers  were  appointed  instructors  in  the 
Korean  army.     The  Korean  arsenal  was  placed  under  Russian 

'Cf.  MacMurray,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  81. 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA  17 

supervision  and  the  Korean  Court  consulted   Russian   advisers, 
and  so  forth. 

China  at  first  looked  favorably  on  such  developments,  evi- 
dently hoping  that  Russia  would  wrest  Korea  from  the  Japanese 
and  later  reestablish  the  lost  Chinese  suzerainty.  Japan,  how- 
ever, was  in  no  way  willing  to  forego  her  interests  and  advan- 
tages in  Korea.  She  was  seemingly  ready  to  acknowledge  Rus- 
sia's influence  in  the  North,  but  on  condition  of  a  reciprocal 
recognition  of  her  own  position  in  the  South.  This,  the  Russian 
Government  never  understood,  but  pushed  serenely  southward, 
thus  bringing  upon  themselves  a  disastrous  conflict  with  Japan. 

It  was  at  that  time  that  Witte's  original  mistake  became  evi- 
dent. He  personally  had  in  view  exclusively  a  commercial  policy 
of  peaceful  penetration,  using  as  means  of  expansion  his  Russo- 
Chinese  Bank  and  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway.  They  were 
powerful  agencies,  no  doubt,  for  the  spreading  of  the  Russian 
control  in  the  Far  East;  they  soon  acquired  a  good  reputation  and 
helped  to  exploit  the  North  China  markets.  But  behind  the  com- 
mercial flag  there  cropped  up  political  influences,  which  sooner 
or  later  were  bound  to  thwart  Witte's  plans  and  give  them  a  much 
more  militant  character.  Here  lay  the  greatest  possible  danger 
for  Russia.  The  more  she  became  involved  in  the  Manchurian 
enterprise,  the  stronger  were  the  temptations  to  move  farther 
and  farther  south,  toward  the  warm  sea,  but  also  right  into  the 
path  of  a  formidable  rival. 

Instead  of  heeding  the  growing  danger,  the  military  and  na- 
tionalistic elements  of  the  Russian  Government  decided  to  take 
their  chances  in  pushing  the  Russian  claims  to  the  limit.  They 
were  not  satisfied  with  Witte's  plan  of  acquiring  another  commer- 
cial outlet  in  the  Pacific,  but  wanted  in  addition  to  get  a  military 
stronghold  there  as  well.  Proofs  exist  that  the  inspiration  for 
building  a  fortified  port  on  the  Gulf  of  Pechili  came  again  from 
Berlin. 1  The  Russian  Government,  however,  willingly  adopted 
the  idea  and  secured  a  hold  on  Port  Arthur  and  the  Liaotung 
peninsula,  which  the  European  Powers  had  forced  Japan  to  re- 

'  Cf.   Herman   Bernstein,   The   Willy-Nicky  Correspondence    (New   York,   1917), 
and  Isaac  Don  Levine,  Letters  from  ilie  Kaiser  to  the  Czar  (New  York,  1920). 


18  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

turn  to  China  a  very  short  time  before.  This,  for  Japan,  meant 
insult  added  to  injury.  It  must  be  said  to  Witte's  honor,  how- 
ever, that  he  at  once  reahzed  the  terrible  danger  of  such  an 
action  and  vigorously  protested,  but  to  no  avail;  the  militarists 
and  imperialists  were  already  in  control. 

In  December  1897  a  Russian  squadron,  commanded  by  Ad- 
miral Doubassofif,  occupied  Port  Arthur.  The  Russian  Charge 
d'Affaires  informed  the  Chinese  Government  that  Russia  had  no 
Intention  of  infringing  the  sovereignty  of  China,  but  merely  de- 
sired to  protect  her  from  the  aggression  of  other  Powers.  Rus- 
sia promised  to  withdraw  as  soon  as  this  danger  disappeared. 
Germany  soon  followed,  occupying  under  the  same  pretext  Klao- 
chow;^  England  took  possession  of  Weihaiwel;  and  France 
seized  Kuangchowwan.  Thus,  instead  of  saving  China  from 
outward  aggression,  Russia's  action  proved  to  be  the  first  step 
towards  the  dangerous  foreign  invasion  of  Chinese  territory 
which  humbled  China's  prestige  and  encroached  upon  her  rights 
of  sovereignty. 

All  of  these  cases  of  occupation  took  the  legal  form  of  "lease 
of  territory,"  very  similar  to  the  idea  embodied  in  the  Russian 
lease  of  the  strip  of  land  across  Manchuria  for  the  Siberian 
Railroad.^  Chinese  sovereignty  was  nominally  maintained  and 
respected,  but  the  local  administration  was  given  entirely  Into 
the  hands  of  the  occupying  foreign  Powers.  The  convention  for 
the  lease  of  Port  Arthur  to  Russia  was  signed  In  Peking  on  March 
27,  1898,  and  an  additional  agreement,  defining  the  boundaries 
of  the  leased  territory,  on  May  7,  1898.  By  this  understanding, 
the  sovereignty  of  China  was  explicitly  recognized,  as  well  as 
the  allegiance  of  the  Chinese  subjects,  but  Russia  acquired  all 
governmental  rights,  being  allowed  to  establish  her  own  courts 
of  law  and  administration  and  given  practically  a  free  hand  there. 
A  few  weeks  later  (July  6,  1898),  an  agreement  was  signed  con- 
cerning the  building  of  the  southern  branch  of  the  Russian  rail- 
way.    This  was  to  connect  the  Siberian  main  line  running  through 

'Germany  actually  s'gned  the  agreement  with  China  a  few  days  earlier  than 
Russia,  March  6  and  27,  respectively. 

^Cf.  MacMurray,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  112  ei  serj.;  also  WiLi-OUCnnv,  Foreujyi  Rights 
mid  Interei'.s  in  China,   (Baltimore,  1920). 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA  19 

the  north  of  Manchuria  with  the  new  outlets  on  the  Liaotung 
peninsula,  Port  Arthur  (for  military  purposes)  and  Dalny  (for 
commercial  use) . 

The  following  years  were  full  of  political  complications,  in- 
volving Russia  more  and  more  In  the  Far  Eastern  tangle.  The 
first  crisis  arose  in  the  years  1900-1901,  during  and  after  the 
Boxer  uprising,  when  the  Empress  Regent  of  China  vainly  en- 
deavored to  get  rid  of  the  foreigners.  While  the  fighting  was 
going  on  m  and  around  Peking,  the  European  Powers  seemed  In 
friendly  accord  and  acted  In  cooperation;  but  as  soon  as  the  up- 
rising was  quelled,  very  serious  divergencies  appeared  and  the 
different  Powers  soon  drifted  away  from  one  another,  each  one 
intent  on  pursuing  its  own  selfish  policy.  Russia's  evident  inten- 
tion in  that  case  was  to  assure  herself  an  absolutely  free  hand  in 
Manchuria  and  thus  consolidate  her  Influence  In  the  Far  East. 
She  succeeded  In  getting  a  valuable  concession  in  Tientsin,  and 
occupying  Newchwang  and  Anshanshan. 

By  this  time,  however,  the  Western  Powers  became  thoroughly 
alarmed  at  the  growth  of  Russia's  influence  and  consequently 
began  to  exert  considerable  pressure  upon  her,  trying  to  make 
her  release  her  hold  on  North  China.  It  was  due  to  that  pres- 
sure that  Russia  concluded  a  new  agreement  with  China,  signed 
on  April  8,  1902,  ostensibly  to  reestablish  Chinese  authority  in 
Manchuria,  in  which  she  promised  to  withdraw  the  Russian 
troops,  leaving  China  to  take  over  the  protection  of  the  railway 
and  of  the  Russian  citizens.' 

Further  promises  followed  on  the  part  of  Russia,  but,  to  the 
great  anxiety  of  the  other  Powers,  none  of  these  promises  seemed 
to  have  been  kept.  Russia  was  slowly  consolidating  her  position 
in  North  China  and  was  not  willing  to  withdraw.  All  sorts  of 
rumors  were  being  spread  on  every  side,  intensifying  the  world's 
distrust  of  Russia's  policy  and  naturally  magnifying  her  aggres- 
siveness and  imperialism.  The  diplomatic  atmosphere  was  be- 
coming steadily  hotter  and  the  political  horizon  darker.  Even 
among  the  Russian  ofliclals  there  were  men,  who  felt  the  storm 

'Details  of  the  cited  transactions  between  Russia  and   China  are  given  in  Mac- 
Murray,  op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  pp.  326  et  seq. 


20  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

coming  and  warned  their  Government,  counseling  moderation, 
but  without  success. 

The  policy  of  Russia  during  the  fateful  years  of  1902-1903 
seemed  on  a  declining  plane.  The  military  and  nationalistic  ele- 
ments were  definitely  in  control  in  St.  Petersburg  and,  as  usual, 
absolutely  blind  to  the  growing  dangers  of  the  situation. 

During  all  this  trouble  China  played  a  very  passive  role.  Out- 
wardly her  sovereignty  was  still  respected,  or  at  least  often  men- 
tioned, but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  her  territory  was  simply  the  play- 
ground for  European  diplomats  and  politicians.  The  Japanese 
war  and  Russia's  defeat  made  no  material  change  in  the  posi- 
tion of  China.  The  former  dominance  of  Russia  was  now  re- 
placed by  a  very  friendly  and  close  cooperation  of  Russia  and 
Japan;  and  the  old  policy  of  exploitation  was  continual  with  little 
regard  for  the  interests  or  wishes  of  the  Chinese.  Consequently, 
the  relations  between  Russia  and  China,  from  1904  to  the  Great 
War,  show  a  marked  absence  of  independence  on  the  part  of 
China. 

III.     Relations  with  Japan 

Russia's  relations  with  Japan,  as  compared  to  her  relations 
with  China,  are  very  different  in  character.  First,  they  are  of 
quite  recent  origin,  and,  secondly,  from  the  very  beginning  they 
have  been  exceedingly  militant. 

Russia  came  into  close  contact  with  Japan  only  at  the  time  of 
the  Sino-Japanese  War  of  1895.  Russia  was  then  energetically 
backing  the  Chinese  plenipotentiaries;  with  the  active  support  of 
the  other  European  Powers,  she  was  endeavoring  to  deprive 
Japan  of  the  fruit  of  her  victory,  by  forcing  her  to  return  to 
China  the  Liaotung  peninsula  and  by  granting  China  loans  with 
which  to  pay  the  war  indemnity. 

Russia  took  this  hostile  stand  toward  Japan  because  she  her- 
self had  developed  definite  ambitions  in  the  Far  East.  One  must 
remember  in  this  respect  that  the  nineties  of  last  century  were  a 
period  of  industrial  expansion  in  Russia,  and  that  among  her 
statesmen  there  were  several  men  of  the  type  of  S.  J.  Witte,  who 
had  made  up  their  minds  that  the  Far  East  could  be  a  splendid 


RELATIONS  WITH  JAPAN  21 

outlet  for  Siberia.  Not  knowing  much  about  Japan,  they  had  a 
thorough  contempt  for  that  country,  but  reahzed  that  the  Japan- 
ese claims,  as  formulated  at  Shimonoseki,  would  forcibly  impede 
Russia  and  compete  with  their  policy  of  controlling  the  North 
China  markets;  hence  the  desire  of  the  Russian  Government  to 
frustrate  any  further  Japanese  advance  in  China. 

Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  flushed  with  her  easy  victory  over 
China,  was  anxious  to  consolidate  her  influence,  at  least  in  Korea, 
and  to  some  extent  in  Southern  Manchuria.  She  must  have  felt 
very  keenly  the  humiliation  inflicted  upon  her  by  the  Great 
Powers,  who  desired  to  limit  her  in  the  use  of  her  victory.' 

There  is  no  doubt  that,  had  Russia  been  careful  in  handling  the 
situation,  an  easy  compromise  would  have  been  achieved.  Japan 
was  still  weak  and  a  novice  in  European  diplomacy,  ready  to  ac- 
cept a  policy  of  cooperation,  provided  it  would  not  hurt  her 
pride  or  damage  her  national  interests.  With  a  better  under- 
standing of  these  circumstances,  Russia  could  have  succeeded  in 
amicably  delineating  the  mutual  spheres  of  interest,  although  cer- 
tainly at  China's  expense.  She  would  have  kept  the  northern 
markets,  permitting  Japan  to  spread  her  influence  southward. 
Such  a  compromise,  however,  was  made  impossible  by  the  increas- 
ing power  of  the  military  and  nationalistic  elements  among  the 
Russian  Court  and  government  circles.  And  it  was  among  these 
circles  least  of  all  that  there  could  be  found  any  desire  to  under- 
stand the  Japanese.  Russia's  attitude  toward  Japan,  in  conse- 
quence, became  extremely  overbearing,  irritating  and  exaspera- 
ting, and  thus  from  the  very  beginning  the  mutual  relations  of 
these  two  countries  were  full  of  suspicion  and  distrust,  which 
created  many  dangerous  misunderstandings.  Japan  had  to 
learn  very  early  the  clandestine  ways  of  European  secret  diplo- 
macy. 

Russia  was  by  no  means  content  to  spread  her  influence  in 
northern  Manchuria  and  to  exploit  the  North  China  markets. 
She  also  wanted  Korea  and  Southern  Manchuria,  endeavoring 

'The  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  at  Shimonoseki  on  April  17,  1895,  and  already, 
on  November  8  of  the  same  year,  Japan  had  to  "retrocede"  to  China  the  Liaotung 
peninsula  with  the  coveted  fortress  of  Port  Arthur.  Cf.  MacMurray,  op.  cit., 
vol.  1,  pp.  18,  50. 


22  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

to  establish  herself  very  firmly  in  Seoul.     This  hold  over  China 
was  to  be  acquired,  as  we  have  seen,  by  means  of  foreign  loans. 

Yet,  this  very  unfavorable  setting  of  the  opening  relations 
between  Russia  and  Japan  could  not  produce  disastrous  conse- 
quences at  once;  it  took  some  years  for  them  to  become  evident. 
As  above  stated,  Japan  at  that  moment  was  a  newcomer  in  the 
game,  feeling  still  weak  and  isolated,  and  she  could  not  well 
afford  vigorous  protests.  Therefore  she  outwardly  subsided, 
keeping  her  temper  and  biding  her  time.  The  Tokyo  Govern- 
ment, notwithstanding  the  mutual  distrust,  realized  that  some 
modus  Vivendi  must  be  established  with  Russia  and  consented  to 
start  diplomatic  conversations,  which  very  soon  resulted  in  the 
conclusion  of  several  agreements. 

First,  there  was  signed  at  St.  Petersburg  on  May  27,  1895, 
a  treaty  of  commerce  and  navigation,  securing  for  the  citizens  of 
both  countries  the  usual  privileges  of  equality  of  treatment  and 
freedom  of  trade,  according  to  the  principle  of  the  "most-fav- 
ored-nation" (Articles  1  and  14).  The  only  exception  was  the 
coastal  trade  of  both  countries,  which  was  regulated  by  munici- 
pal legislation  (Article  10) .  It  is  important  to  note  that  Article 
17  of  that  treaty  makes  a  special  mention  of  abolishing  hence- 
forth any  rights  of  extraterritoriality  in  Japan,  and  Article  18,  of 
superceding  all  the  previous  agreements  then  existing  between 
Russia  and  Japan.'  Finally,  Article  19  contains  the  provision 
that  the  treaty  should  go  into  effect  only  four  years  after  its  con- 
clusion. Such  a  long  period  does  not  often  lapse  between  the 
conclusion  of  international  treaties  and  the  date  on  which  they  go 
into  effect,  and  can  be  taken  as  another  proof  of  how  wary  of  one 
another  the  signatory  Powers  were  at  the  time.^  This  treaty 
went  into  effect  on  July  17,  1899,  according  to  a  special  announce- 
ment of  the  respective  Governments,  and  it  was  not  until  that 
date  that  Russia  finally  lost  her  privileges  of  extraterritorial 
jurisdiction  in  Japan.     Thus  we  see  how  late  the  principle  of 

^There  was  made,  however,  one  exception,  namely  for  the  treaty  of  May  7,  1875, 
which  was  to  contiue  in  full  force.  This  was  the  treaty  that  settled  the  dispute 
between  Russia  and  Japan  concerning  Sakhalin  and  the  Kuriles  Islands. 

-The  text  of  this  treaty  can  be  found  in  the  Sbornik,  published  by  the  Russian 
Foreign  Office,  vol.  I,  no.  65,  p.  500.  A  similar  treaty  was  concluded  with  England 
in   1^94    (Kimberley-Aoki),   also   abolishing  extraterritoriality. 


RELATIONS  WITH  JAPAN  23 

equality  came  into  being  in  the  mutual  relations  of  Russia  and 
Japan. 

Secondly,  both  Governments  tried  to  adjust  their  policies  in 
Korea,  where  Russia  was  endeavoring  to  establish  her  influence. 
For  the  time  being,  Japan  seemed  to  have  decided  to  seek  the 
cooperation  of  Russia.  Accordingly,  on  June  16,  1896,  a  proto- 
col was  signed  at  St.  Petersburg  (Lobanoff-Yamagata) ,  in  which 
the  two  Powers  promised  to  cooperate  in  Korea  and  withdraw 
their  armed  forces.  But  no  sooner  was  this  act  signed,  than  it 
was  violated  by  Russia,  who  started  to  gain  control  of  the  Korean 
army  and  the  Korean  finances.  This  naturally  aroused  suspi- 
cions and  opposition  on  all  sides,  Japan  in  particular  being  anxious 
to  frustrate  the  Russian  aims.  The  protests  that  followed  made 
Russia  realize  that  she  had  gone  too  far;  and  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment made  an  effort  to  allay  the  Japanese  distrust  by  beginning 
new  conversations,  which  ended  in  the  signing  of  another  proto- 
col, this  time  at  Tokyo,  on  April  25,  1898  (Nishi-Rosen),  in 
which  both  Powers  agreed  once  more  to  recognize  the  sovereignty 
and  independence  of  Korea,  while  still  secretly  hoping  to  super- 
cede them  by  their  own  control.  Any  future  interference  with 
the  Korean  army  or  finances  could  take  place  only  by  common 
agreement  and  mutual  consent;  Russia  in  particular  promised  not 
to  "obstruct  the  development  of  the  commercial  and  industrial 
relations  between  Japan  and  Korea."  Such  were  the  first  steps 
in  this  very  complicated  situation,  when  Russia  and  Japan  com- 
menced to  match  their  forces,  the  latter  Power  still  badly  handi- 
capped by  her  inferiority  and  isolation. 

The  Boxer  Uprising  of  1900  taught  a  second  and  much  more 
important  lesson  to  Japan.  The  policy  of  the  Great  Powers 
toward  China  after  the  rebellion,  and  their  evident  desire  to 
seize  what  they  could  in  the  disintegration  of  the  Middle  King- 
dom, made  Japan  desire  to  participate  in  the  division  of  spoils 
on  an  equal  footing  with  the  other  Powers.  This,  also,  must 
have  forced  her  to  realize  more  than  ever,  that  she  could  not 
achieve  much  while  she  was  isolated;  in  other  words,  Tokyo  must 
have  seen  the  necessity  of  finding  some  friend  among  the  Europ- 
ean Powers. 


24  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

The  first  object,  to  establish  her  participation  in  the  Far  East- 
ern policy  of  the  Great  Powers,  was  easier  attained  than  the  sec- 
ond one,  to  find  an  ally.  After  the  abrogation  of  extraterrito- 
riality (in  the  nineties)  and  the  cooperation  of  Japanese  troops 
during  the  quelling  of  the  Boxer  uprising,  Japan  succeeded  in  se- 
curing a  position  of  relative  equality  among  the  other  nations. 
At  least,  there  were  several  occasions  when  Japan  participated  in 
the  common  action  of  the  Powers  toward  China;  for  instance,  she 
took  part  in  the  transactions  concerning  the  "open  door"  policy, 
championed  by  the  United  States  in  1900,  and  in  those  relating 
to  the  re-establishment  of  peaceful  and  normal  conditions  after 
the  Boxer  riots,  in  the  same  year.i  Yet  this  did  not  completely 
satisfy  her.  Japan  wanted  more  than  participation;  she  was 
intent  on  expansion,  and  this  she  could  not  achieve  alone. 

Thus,  in  1900  Japan  set  out  to  find  a  friend  and  ally.  She 
carefully  examined  the  complex  situation  in  Europe,  tested  the 
relative  strength  of  the  different  Powers,  their  past  history,  mu- 
tual relations,  political  conditions  and  modes  of  development. 
On  the  whole,  one  must  acknowledge  the  great  success  of  this 
task.  Owing  to  subtle  methods  and  the  statesmanlike  qualities 
of  her  diplomatic  representatives,  Japan  sized  up  the  European 
situation  extremely  well.  It  soon  became  evident  that  her  choice 
must  lie  between  England  and  Russia.  France  did  not  count  for 
much  in  Far  Eastern  affairs,  and  Germany  purposely  declined  any 
direct  participation,  preferring  to  remain  behind  the  scenes. 
During  the  years  1900-1901  Japan  cautiously  felt  her  way, 
studying  the  situation  simultaneously  in  London  and  St.  Peters- 
burg. Baron  Hayashi  conducted  conversations  with  Lord  Lans- 
downe,  while  the  Marquis  Ito  had  his  talks  v/ith  Witte  and 
Lamsdorff;  the  Government  at  Tokyo  received  the  reports  from 
both  sides  and  had  abundant  and  enlightening  material  for  mak- 
ing the  necessary  choice. 

The  difference  in  the  character  of  the  foreign  policies  of  the 
two  countries  were  soon  apparent.  Whereas  Russia  was  con- 
stantly overbearing  and  haughty,  England  seemed  ready  to  enter 
into  some  understanding  on  terms  of  perfect  equality.  There 
is  good  reason  to  believe  that  at  the  beginning  Tokyo  might 

'Cf.  MacMurray,  op.  (it.,  vol.  i,  pp.  221,  230,  278,  309. 


RELATIONS  WITH  JAPAN  25 

have  preferred  an  agreement  with  Russia :  the  two  coun- 
tries were  near  neighbors;  they  had  the  same  interests  in  Man- 
churia, In  China,  and  on  the  Pacific  coast;  an  aUiance  between 
them  would  have  been  the  natural  outcome  for  the  whole  situa- 
tion, solving  most  difficulties.  But  the  chance  was  hopelessly 
spoiled  by  the  arrogant  attitude  and  the  shortsightedness  of  the 
Russian  Government. 

In  1901  the  Tokyo  Government  finally  made  up  their  minds 
in  favor  of  England  and  instructed  Baron  Hayashi  to  proceed 
with  his  conversations  with  Lord  Lansdowne.  These  trans- 
actions soon  took  a  definite  form,  culminating  in  the  signing 
in  London  of  the  i\nglo-Japanese  Treaty  of  Alliance  on  Janu- 
ary 30,  1902.  It  cannot  be  said  that  China  profited  by  the 
final  choice  of  Japan.  The  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  was  and 
proved  to  be  a  no  better  guarantee  for  the  integrity  of  the  Chin- 
ese Empire  than  any  Russo-Japanese  agreement  would  have 
been. 

To  appreciate  in  full  the  diplomatic  situation  of  that  epoch, 
one  must  keep  in  mind  the  position  taken  by  Germany.  Between 
England  and  Russia  she  was  the  tertius  gaudens,  carefully  ab- 
staining from  any  direct  participation.  She  was  well  informed 
of  what  was  going  on  both  in  London  and  St.  Petersburg,  but 
much  preferred  to  have  her  hands  absolutely  free.  Thus,  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1902,  when  Komura,  the  Japanese  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  asked  the  German  Ambassador  if  his  country  cared  to 
join  the  new  alliance,  the  latter  politely  but  firmly  declined. 
Least  of  all  did  Germany  at  that  moment  want  to  cooperate 
with  Great  Britain.' 

Having  secured  such  a  powerful  ally,  Japan  naturally  felt  much 
stronger.  She  was  now  quite  able  to  withstand  the  Russian  dip- 
lomatic pressure,  and  effectively  asserted  her  own  claims,  es- 
pecially in  Korea,  while  Russia,  on  her  side,  was  absolutely  blind 
to  the  danger  Involved  in  constantly  increasing  her  demands  and 
thus  proceeding  headlong  Into  a  disastrous  conflict.  Neither  the 
Russian  Government,  nor  the  Court  circles  and  the  Tsar  him- 
self wanted  to  believe  that  Japan  could  press  her  claims  home, 
and  In  particular  that  she  was  now  starting  feverishly  to  prepare 

'Cf.  Memoirs  of  Hayashi  and   Eckardtstein. 


26  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

for  an  armed  encounter.     They  still  treated  the  Japanese  as  a 
negligible  quantity  and  chose  that  most  dangerous  moment  for 
launching  a  foolish  and  criminal  enterprise  in  Korea,  in  the  very 
center  of  Japanese  ambitions. 
^.  f  A  few  unscrupulous  adventurers,  a  former  officer  of  the  guards, 

■^"  Bezobrazof,  an  Admiral,  Abaza,  and  some  less  known  men  took 

advantage  of  the  situation,  and  persuaded  the  Tsar  of  the  re- 
markable financial  possibilities  of  exploiting  the  Korean  natural 
resources.  They  organized  a  private  company  for  the  purpose 
of  exploiting  a  timber  and  mining  concession  on  the  Yalu  River 
and  succeeded  in  convincing  the  Tsar  and  several  members  of  his 
family  to  invest  their  personal  capital  in  that  concession.  The 
local  officials  in  the  Far  East,  with  the  Viceroy,  Admiral  Alex- 
eiev,  at  their  head,  seeing  the  influence  that  Bezobrazof  had  at 
Court,  acquiesced  instead  of  protesting  and  warning  their  Gov- 
ernment of  the  imminent  danger  that  such  action  created  by 
arousing  the  Japanese.  Much  more  blame,  however,  falls  on 
the  Russian  Ministers,  who  did  not  object  against  this  short- 
sighted enterprise.  Witte  alone  realized  the  danger  and  strongly 
urged  his  Government  to  take  immediate  measures  to  check  the 
adventure  of  Bezobrazof,  but  absolutely  in  vain.  In  the  Gov- 
ernment there  were  actually  Ministers  who  were  glad  to  see  more 
trouble  coming  with  Japan,  hoping  that  it  would  divert  the  at- 
tention of  the  Russian  nation  from  the  constantly  growing  social 
dissatisfaction.  For  instance,  Plehve,  Minister  of  the  Interior, 
cynically  remarked  that  "a  little  war  would  help  the  Government 
very  much."  The  war,  however,  proved  to  be  neither  little,  nor 
of  any  help  to  the  autocratic  Government.  The  Tsar  himself 
seemed  to  have  had  only  contempt  for  Japan,  a  feeling  which 
was  strengthened  by  his  own  conceit,  as  well  as  by  the  pernicious 
influence  of  the  Kaiser.  Wilhelm  was  cleverly  and  strongly  urg- 
ing the  Tsar  to  withstand  the  Japanese  claims,  thus  leading  him 
toward  a  certain  armed  conflict.  Germany  could  lose  nothing 
by  such  a  policy,  but  could  gain  immensely  by  involving  Russia  in 
a  Far  Eastern  quarrel. 

Neither  was  the  Yalu  adventure  the  only  mistake  of  Russia; 
simultaneously  she  tried  to  lease  the  harbor  of  Mosampo  from 
Korea  intending  to  transform  it  into  a  naval  base  while  her  agent, 


RELATIONS  WITH  JAPAN  27 

Pavlov,  intrigued  at  the  Seoul  court.  In  order  to  checkmate  the 
Russian  designs,  Japan  started  direct  negotiations  in  St.  Peters- 
burg and  during  the  summer  of  1903  made  a  last  effort  to  settle 
the  dispute  amicably,  but  again  met  in  St.  Petersburg  with  a  dis- 
tinct reluctance  on  the  part  of  Russia  to  give  her  any  decisive 
answer.  The  Russian  replies  were  as  evasive  and  unsatisfac- 
tory as  ever.' 

Witte  describes  this  in  his  Memoirs'^  in  a  striking  sentence  :  "We 
were  headed  straight  for  war  and  at  the  same  time  we  did  nothing 
to  prepare  ourselves  for  the  eventuality;  we  acted  as  if  we  were 
certain  that  the  Japanese  would  endure  everything  without  dar- 
ing to  attack  us."  This  was  absolutely  true.  Unfortunately  Witte 
himself  has  to  bear  a  serious  part  of  the  blame  for  at  least  having 
started  the  aggressive  Russian  policy,  though  personally  he  had 
only  "peaceful  penetration"  in  view. 

On  January  13,  1904,  Japan  finally  lost  patience,  and  presented 
her  fourth  proposals,  which  amounted  to  an  ultimatum.  She  de- 
clared that  she  was  prepared  to  recognize  Russian  interests  in 
Manchuria,  provided  Russia  would  acknowledge  the  Japanese 
control  over  Korea.  But  even  then  Russia  temporized  and 
evaded  answering  the  Japanese  demands.  On  February  8,  the 
Japanese  destroyers  entered  Port  Arthur  and  fired  torpedoes  at 
the  unprepared  and  unprotected  Russian  battleships.  The  fol- 
lowing day  war  was  declared. 

From  the  very  beginning,  the  war  with  Japan  was  not  popular 
among  the  Russian  people;  most  of  them  never  even  understood 
for  what  their  country  was  fighting.  It  did  help,  however,  to 
increase  immensely  the  strength  of  the  revolutionary  discontent. 
As  defeat  followed  defeat,  the  Government  was  gradually  forced, 
in  the  summer  of  1905,  to  grant  half-hearted  and  insincere  con- 
cessions. This  social  dissatisfaction  finally  forced  the  Govern- 
ment to  conclude  the  peace  which  was  signed  on  September  5, 
1905,  at  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire.-'  According  to  the  Peace 
Treaty,  Russia  returned  to  Japan  the  leased  Liaotung  peninsula, 

iCf.  Staatsarchiv,  vol.  69,  pp.  212,  et.  seq.;  Stanley  K.  Hornbeck,  Contemporary 
Politics  in  the  Far  East   (N.  Y.,  1916),  ch.  xiv,  p.  243. 
'Sergiei  Witte,  Memoirs  (N.  Y.,  1921),  p.  123. 
'Cf.  MacMurray,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  522. 


28  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

including  Port  Arthur  and  Talienwan  (Dalny),  and  ceded  in  ad- 
dition the  southern  half  of  the  Sakhalin  Island  (Articles  5  and  9). 
Japan  also  received  the  southern  branch  of  the  Manchurian  rail- 
road (from  Kuancheng-tzu  down  to  Port  Arthur;  Article  6),  as 
well  as  the  coal  mines  worked  for  the  benefit  of  the  railroad, 
which  proved  a  very  important  acquisition  for  the  control  of  the 
South  Manchurian  markets.  All  these  transfers  of  privileges 
in  Manchuria  were  nominally  to  be  sanctioned  by  China  ("The 
two  High  Contracting  Powers  mutually  engage  to  obtain  the  con- 
sent of  the  Government  of  China"),  a  stipulation  which  was 
meant  to  safeguard  the  Chinese  rights  of  sovereignty.  No  war 
indemnity  was  exacted  from  Russia;  this  was  probably  the  most 
remarkable  achievement  of  Witte  at  the  Portsmouth  Confer- 
ence. 

With  the  treaty  of  Portsmouth  begins  an  entirely  new  epoch 
in  the  history  of  Russia's  position  in  the  Far  East,  and  in  her 
relations  with  Japan  as  well — an  epoch  very  different  in  character 
and  meaning  from  the  preceding  period.  Instead  of  the  former 
hostility  and  mutual  distrust  we  find  close  cooperation  and  friend- 
ship between  these  two  Empires.  They  now  amicably  agreed 
to  define  their  mutual  interests  and  spheres  of  influence  and  de- 
cided to  assist  one  another  in  the  exploitation  of  China  and  Man- 
churia; Korea  was  henceforth  entirely  given  over  to  the  full  con- 
trol of  Japan  and  soon  became  a  mere  dependency. 

The  sudden  change  that  came  over  the  relations  of  Russia  and 
Japan,  a  change  so  thorough  and  complete  that  it  transformed 
hatred  and  suspicion  into  friendship  and  copartnership,  can  serve 
as  a  convincing  proof  of  how  much  artificiality  there  was  in  the 
former  relations  of  the  two  Empires  and  how  easily  could  have 
been  established  some  sort  of  friendly  jnodiis  vivendi.  This 
time,  however,  the  Powers  went  to  the  other  extreme,  evincing 
a  distinct  desire  to  exclude  any  outside  interference  with  what  they 
were  doing  or  intending  to  do  in  North  China.  There  could  be 
no  question  any  more  of  an  "open  door"  policy  in  Manchuria; 
the  door  was  definitely  slammed. 

The  treaty  of  Portsmouth  necessitated  further  agreements; 
first,  China  was  to  express  her  acquiescence;  secondly,  Russia  and 
Japan  themselves  had  to  settle  additional  details  in  order  to  carry 


RELATIONS  WITH  JAPAN  29 

out  several  provisions  of  the  treaty.  For  instance  a  separate  con- 
vention was  to  be  concluded  for  the  regulation  of  the  connecting 
railway  services  in  Manchuria,  special  procedure  was  to  be 
adopted  concerning  the  option  of  Russian  citizens  in  the  ceded 
territories  and  concerning  their  real  estate  and  other  property. 
Further,  Russia  promised  to  grant  Japan  extensive  fisheries  rights 
on  the  Pacific  coast  and  to  reestablish  the  former  principles  of 
the  commercial  treaty  with  Japan  (1895),  which  had  been  in 
abeyance  during  the  war.  China  sanctioned  the  transfer  of 
leased  territories  from  Russia  to  Japan  in  a  special  treaty,  signed 
in  Peking,  December  22,  1905.  It  is  very  significant  that  Japan 
in  this  respect  promised  to  conform  to  the  original  agreements 
concluded  between  China  and  Russia,  "so  far  as  circumstances 
permit"  (Article  2)  ;  this  formula  gave  Japan  practically  a  free 
hand  in  Manchuria, ^  though  she  repeatedly  promised  not  to  im- 
pair in  any  way  Chinese  sovereignty  and  not  to  act  inconsistently 
with  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  (cf.  Article  3,  Treaty  of 
Portsmouth) . 

In  1907  followed  new  agreements  with  Russia,  but  of  two 
distinct  types.  First,  further  arrangements  for  commercial  pur- 
poses were  made,  all  of  which  were  public;  second,  treaties 
defining  the  mutual  political  interests  were  signed.  To  the  first 
type  of  agreements  belong  the  Convention  and  Protocol,  signed 
in  St.  Petersburg  on  June  13,  1907,  concerning  the  junction  of 
the  Russian  and  Japanese  railways  in  Manchuria,  the  Convention, 
signed  on  July  28,  concerning  commerce  and  navigation,  and  an- 
other one,  signed  the  same  day  and  relating  to  the  fisheries  of  the 
Pacific  coast — the  latter  extremely  valuable  to  the  Japanese — and, 
finally,  numerous  agreements,  signed  by  Russia  and  China  on 
the  one  hand,  and  by  Japan  and  China  on  the  other,  concerning 
the  local  situation  in  Manchuria,  postal  communications,  tele- 
graph lines,  exploitation  of  mines,  new  railroad  construction, 
etc.-  This  was  only  a  natural  consequence  of  the  newly  estab- 
lished accord  between  Russia  and  Japan,  who  had  to  readjust 
their  mutual  policy  of  exploiting  Manchuria.  Most  of  these 
agreements  have  a  purely  technical  character. 

'MacMurray,  op.  fit.,  vol.  I,  p.  557  et.  seq. 
'Cf.  MacMurray,  op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  pp.  612-803. 


30  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Quite  different  is  the  second  type,  which  was  meant  to  support 
politically  the  above  mentioned  commercial  policy  of  the  two  new 
friends  and  allies.  Two  agreements  belong  to  this  group,  one 
made  public,^  the  other  remaining  secret  even  up  to  the  present 
day.^  They  belong  to  the  same  period  of  1907,  and  were  meant, 
to  describe  comprehensively  the  spheres  of  mutual  interest;  to 
maintain  the  sovereignty  of  China'*;  and  to  respect  the  status  quo, 
endeavoring  thus  to  exclude  any  possible  intrusion  or  advance  of 
any  other  Power  in  Manchuria.  It  was  this  last  object  that  the 
secret  agreement  of  that  year  was  intended  to  further  confirm 
and  consolidate,  aiming  at  the  friendly  advice  of  the  United 
States,  which  was  earnestly  trying  to  enforce  the  policy  of  the 
"open  door."  Neither  Russia  nor  Japan  wanted  any  such  inter- 
ference in  a  sphere  that  they  now  considered  their  very  own. 

Meanwhile,  the  American  Government  insisted  on  the  "open 
door"  principle.  During  the  Taft  administration.  Secretary 
Knox  worked  out  a  whole  project  of  neutralization  of  the  Man- 
churian  railroads  and  the  opening  up  of  Manchuria  in  general  for 
international  trade."*  This  brought  a  prompt  and  decisive  re- 
fusal from  the  two  allied  Empires  and  a  new  agreement  between 
them,  partly  secret,  signed  in  St.  Petersburg  on  July  4,  1910.^ 

Russia  and  Japan  once  more  affirmed  their  desire  to  cooperate 
in  Manchuria,  to  m.aintain  the  status  quo  and  to  communicate 
with  each  other  in  all  questions  concerning  such  a  mutual  policy. 
This  naturally  frustrated  the  fight  for  the  "open  door,"  as  it  was 

'Cf.  MacMurray,  op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  p.  657. 

^It  is  only  vaguely  referred  to  in  later  treaties. 

^The  object  of  recognizing  China's  "independence  and  territorial  integrity" 
seems  only  to  have  been  a  blind  for  the  exclusion  of  any  other  Power. 

Tor  details  see,  e.  g.,  J.  F.  Abbott,  Japanese  expansion  and  American  Policies 
(N.  Y.,  1916),  eh.  in,  p.  65. 

'Cf.  MacMurray,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  803;  the  alleged  secret  treaty  of  that  date 
was  published  by  the  New  York  World  in  a  series  of  articles  by  Capt.  Schreiner  and 
B.  von  Siebert,  in  the  spring  of  1921 ;  the  text  runs  as  follows: 

"To  confirm  and  further  develop  the  provisions  of  the  Secret  Treaty  of  June 
17-30,  1907,  the  Russian  and  the  Japanese  governments  agree  to  the  following  pro- 
visions: 

"Article  1.  Russia  and  Japan  recognize  as  the  boundary  of  their  specific  spheres 
of  interest  in  Manchuria  the  line  of  demarcation  as  defined  in  the  supplementary 
article  of  the  Secret  Treaty  of  1907. 

"Art.  2.  The  two  contracting  parties  agree  mutually  to  recognize  their  special 
interests  in  the  areas  set  forth  above.  Each  of  them  may  also,  each  with'n  its  own 
f.phere  of  interest,  take  such  measures  as  shall  be  deemed  necessary  for  the  main- 
tenance and  protection  of  these  interests. 


RELATIONS  WITH  JAPAN  31 

meant  to  do,  and  was  a  strong  refutation  of  the  proposal  of 
Secretary  Knox.  Russia  and  Japan  were  asserting  that  nothing 
really  threatened  the  integrity  of  China,  nor  the  principle  of  the 
"open  door";  that  the  Chinese  Empire  could  find  a  much  better 
safeguard  in  their  alliance  than  in  any  international  compact; 
and  that  the  idea  of  making  Manchuria  a  buffer  state  was  most 
distasteful  to  them.  Finally,  it  is  important  to  note  that  Great 
Britain  was  at  that  time  very  much  pleased  with  the  development 
of  friendly  relations  between  Russia  and  Japan  and  told  them 
so  several  times.  After  1907  England  began  to  build  up  friendly 
relations  with  Russia  and  was  in  consequence  very  eager  to  help 
the  cooperation  of  Russia  with  her  own  Eastern  ally  and  for  that 
reason  unhesitatingly  gave  her  support  to  the  new  Far  Eastern 
policy  of  the  Government  of  the  Tsar.  During  the  years  that 
followed  we  see  the  further  development  of  the  same  policy  on 
similar  lines;  the  mutual  commercial  interests  were  being  settled 
by  public  agreements,  concluded  ad  hoc,  as  necessity  called  for 
determining  newly  arising  details  of  daily  life,i  and  parallel  was 
kept  the  close  political  cooperation,  couched  in  terms  of  secret 
agreements.  On  July  8,  1912,  a  third  secret  treaty  was  signed, 
mentioned  in  the  alleged  secret  treaty  of  1916,  having  evidently 
the  same  object  in  view,  viz.,  the  mutual  assistance  in  the  exploi- 
tation of  Manchuria  and  in  the  exclusion  of  the  other  Powers 
from  any  participation  in  the  North  China  trade. 

This  policy  naturally  found  its  climax  during  the  Great  War. 
On  July  3,  1916,  two  more  agreements  were  signed  at  Petrograd, 

"Art.  3.  Each  party  undertakes  to  place  no  obstacle  of  any  kind  in  the  way  of 
the  confirmation  and  future  development  of  the  special  interests  of  the  other  party 
within  the  boundary  lines  of  such  spheres  of  interest. 

"Art.  4.  Each  of  the  contracting  parties  undertakes  to  refrain  from  all  political 
action  within  the  sphere  of  interest  of  the  other  party  in  Manchuria.  Furthermore, 
it  has  been  decided  that  Russia  shall  seek  no  privileges  and  concessions  in  the 
Japanese  zone,  and  Japan  none  in  the  Russian  zone,  that  might  be  injurious  to  the 
special  interests  of  either  party  and  that  both  Governments  are  to  recognize  the 
rights  acquired  in  their  spheres  of  interest,  as  defined  in  Article  2  of  the  Public 
Treaty  of  today's  date. 

"Art.  5.  To  ensure  the  working  of  the  mutual  stipulations,  both  parties  will  enter 
into  an  open  and  friendly  exchange  of  opinions  on  all  matters  concerning  their 
special  interests  in  Manchuria.  In  case  these  special  interests  should  be  threatened, 
the  two  Governments  will  agree  on  the  measures  that  may  become  necessary  for 
common  action  or  mutual  support  in  order  to  protect  these  interests. 

"Art.  6.  The  present  treaty  will  be  kept  strictly  secret  by  both  Governments." 

'For  example,  the  Convention  for  reciprocal  protection  of  industrial  property  in 
China,  signed  in  Tokyo  on  June  23,  1911,  or  the  Convention  of  .August  14,  1911, 
concerning  railway  connections  in    Manchuria. 


32  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

one  made  public  under  the  title  of  "Convention  in  Regard  to  Co- 
operation in  the  Far  East,"  the  other,  kept  secret,  amounted  to  a 
treaty  of  alliance.^  There  is  no  trace  left  of  the  former  enmity 
of  these  two  Powers,  acting  now  as  close  and  old  friends,  ready 
to  stand  by  one  another  against  "any  third  Power  whatsoever" 
(Article  1  of  the  secret  treaty  of  1916). 

This  last  phrase  of  the  treaty  of  1916  very  naturally  aroused 
the  greatest  concern  among  several  foreign  Powers,  as  it  forcibly 
expressed  a  defensive  alliance  of  the  two  autocratic  Empires, 
whose  policy  could  so  easily  develop  offensive  aims.  For  China 
it  meant  the  final  loss  of  her  Northern  Provinces  and  a  very  ef- 
fectively "closed  door"  for  her  northern  markets.  For  the  out- 
side world  it  meant  a  compact,  built  up  on  secret  agreements,  that 
could  be  dangerous  on  account  of  the  undemocratic  form  of 
government  of  the  two  contracting  Powers.  In  view  of  the 
tremendous  significance  of  the  enumerated  Russo-Japanese  trea- 
ties, it  would  seem  quite  necessary  that  their  texts  should  be  made 
public.  This  could  be  achieved  the  more  easily  at  the  present 
day  because,  on  account  of  the  collapse  of  Russia,  they  all  have 
lost  their  political  importance. 

Of  course  it  is  not  the  mere  fact  of  Russia  concluding  a  friendly 
alliance  with  Japan  that  could  ever  be  objected  to  or  feared  by 
the  other  Powers,  but,  rather,  the  evident  aims  that  such  an  un- 
derstanding had  in  view.  Nobody  could  object  to  the  establish- 
ment and  growth  of  friendship  and  good-will  between  the  two  Far 
Eastern  neighbors.  On  the  contrary,  such  an  agreement  could 
have  been  hailed  with  enthusiasm  as  being  far  better  than  the 
former  enmity.  Unfortunately,  however,  this  cordial  coopera- 
tion had  in  view  not  only  the  exploitation  of  the  North  China 
markets  to  the  detriment  of  Chinese  sovereignty  rights,  but  also 
threatened  the  integrity  of  China  and  was  meant  to  exclude  all 
other  Powers,  in  particular  the  United  States  of  America,  and  to 
frustrate  any  attempt  at  establishing  an  "open  door"  policy. 

'The  texts  of  both   agreements   are   published    by   MacMurray,   vol.    u,   p.    1327- 
1328.     Cf.  also  J.  Sparco,  Russia  as  an  American  Problem,  1920,  ch.  IV. 


■  RELATIONS  WITH  MONGOLIA  33 

IV.     Relations  with  Mongolia 

During  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  Great  War,  we  can 
witness  the  inception  by  Russia  of  a  new  policy,  this  time  concern- 
ing Mongolia.  It  might  seem  as  though,  thwarted  by  Japan  in 
her  aggression  in  Manchuria,  Russia  was  now  trying  to  expand 
her  influence  in  a  new  direction.  Though  possessing  some  de- 
ceptive appearances,  this  movement  had  no  great  significance. 
It  never  had  the  backing  of  the  nation  at  large,  nor  did  even  the 
Government  attach  much  importance  to  it;  only  a  very  few  gov- 
ernment officials  were  interested  in  it,  and  the  support  was  mainly 
among  the  South  Siberian  tradesmen. 

The  Mongolian  point  of  contact  between  Russia  and  China  was 
not  a  new  one;  on  the  contrary,  as  we  have  seen  above,  it  was 
along  the  endless  stretch  of  the  Mongolian  frontier  that  Russia 
came  first  in  touch  with  China,  several  centuries  ago.  Yet,  not- 
withstanding this  long  space  of  time  the  contact  never  developed 
into  anything  significant.  This  fact  is  easily  explained  if  we 
consider  the  general  character  of  the  country  bordering  on  the 
southern  frontiers  of  Siberia.  Mongolia  is  a  very  sparsely  popu- 
lated country,  mostly  desert,  with  but  a  few  inhabited  centers. 
The  Mongolian  market  never  amounted  to  much,  the  people  were 
poor  and  trade  was  lagging.  Only  in  one  way  do  we  find  that 
these  regions  had  any  importance  for  the  Russian  trade,  namely, 
this:  through  Mongolia  several  caravan  routes  lead  into  China, 
connecting  southern  Siberia  with  some  of  the  Chinese  markets; 
it  was  along  these  routes  that  Russia  imported  great  quantities  of 
Chinese  tea  and  no  mean  amount  of  Chinese  silk,  sending  South, 
in  return,  some  very  fine  qualities  of  wool,  hides,  and  different 
drugs,  used  by  the  superstitious  Mongols.  But  even  in  this  latter 
respect,  the  Mongolian  caravan  routes  had  lately  lost  most  of 
their  importance,  because  many  of  the  goods  could  be  carried 
much  less  expensively  and  considerably  quicker  by  the  Siberian 
and  Manchurian  railways.  In  consequence,  there  remained  only 
a  slight  frontier  trade  of  the  local  population,  a  fact  which  is  quite 
sufficient  to  demonstrate  the  relative  lack  of  interest  in  Siberia 
and  Russia,  as  shown  toward  the  government  policy  in  the  Mon- 
golian question. 


34  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

From  olden  days  Mongolia  was  divided  into  two  unequal  parts, 
Outer  Mongolia,  occupying  an  extensive  territory,  but  chiefly 
desert  and  wilderness,  and  Inner  Mongolia  in  the  South,  smaller 
in  size,  but  more  densely  inhabited  and  interesting  China  very 
much  more,  as  there  existed  not  only  well  developed  commercial 
relations  with  China,  but  also  a  numerous  Chinese  population 
settled  among  the  Mongols  and  exploiting  the  latter  ruthlessly. 
Trouble  arose  in  1910  over  the  question  of  the  renewal  of  the 
Russian-Chinese  Treaty  of  1881.'  Russia  reminded  China  of 
the  necessity  of  renewing  this  understanding,  insisting,  however, 
on  the  introduction  of  some  important  changes.  She  had  greatly 
increased  her  trade  in  Turkestan,  and  China  wanted  to  profit  from 
this  trade  by  establishing  customs  there;  Russia  strongly  objected 
and  continued  selling  Chinese  tea  in  the  Turkestan  Provinces. 
China  held  that  such  action  was  not  in  accord  with  the  treaty  of 
1881.  Russia  chose  this  very  propitious  moment  to  ask  for  new 
privileges  on  account  of  China's  ostensible  weakness.  It  was  not 
only  the  desire  of  the  local  Russian  tradesmen  to  acquire  some 
new  rights,  nor  was  it  simply  the  restlessness  of  a  few  Russian 
officials,  but  mainly  the  wish  to  take  advantage  of  the  troubles 
that  China  herself  had  on  hand.  Russia  had  in  view,  first,  the 
dissatisfaction  developing  in  Northern  China:  and  secondly,  the 
desire  for  independence  from  Chinese  sovereignty,  then  existing 
amxong  the  various  Mongolian  Princes.  The  latter  resented  very 
much  the  sharp  and  underhand  practices  of  the  Chinese  mer- 
chants, especially  in  Inner  Mongolia,  and  the  consecutive  at- 
tempts of  reforms  on  the  part  of  China,  moves  which  the  Mon- 
golians considered  to  be  interferences  with  their  local  self-gov- 
ernment. The  Chinese  Government,  however,  notwithstanding 
its  weakness  and  the  various  political  difficulties  surrounding  it 
from  all  sides,  succeeded  in  withstanding  the  Russian  and  Mon- 
golian claims  for  some  time. 

In  the  summer  of  1911  the  Mongolian  Princes  decided  to  co- 
operate against  China.  In  December,  after  the  Chinese  revolu- 
tion had  broken  out,  they  proclaimed  themselves  independent  and 
elected  the  Khutukhtu  of  Urga  "Emperor  of  Mongolia."  He  was 
crowned  with  great  ceremony  on  December  28,  1911.     There  is 

'The  treaty  had  been  renewed  twice  already,  in  1891  and  1901,  without  any 
difiiculty. 


RELATIONS  WITH  MONGOLIA  35 

no  doubt  that  Russian  agents  were  successfully  backing  these  pro- 
ceedings, pledging  Russian  aid  to  the  Mongolian  Princes  for  es- 
tablishing the  independence  of  Outer  Mongolia.  In  return  for 
this  help  the  Mongolians  promised  Russia  all  sorts  of  privileges 
and  advantages. 

Further,  in  1912  the  Mongolian  Princes  concluded  a  treaty  of 
alliance  with  Thibet  having  the  same  object  in  view,  the  separa- 
tion from  China  and  political  independence.  Meanwhile  Russia 
had  declared  that  she  considered  the  treaty  of  1881  still  in  force, 
but  no  longer  recognized  the  neutral  zone  mentioned  in  this 
agreement.  Parallel  to  that,  Russia  signed  a  treaty  with  the 
newly  constituted  Mongolian  Government  at  Urga  on  November 
3,  1912.  The  Russian  Government  promised  to  assist  Mon- 
golia in  establishing  and  maintaining  her  autonomy.  The  Mon- 
golians in  return  granted  many  new  privileges  to  Russia,  with  a 
definite  mention  in  addition,  that  no  privileges  should  be  given  to 
other  foreign  subjects,  that  were  not  enjoyed  by  Russians.' 
China  had  finally  to  yield,  recognizing  at  last  the  autonomy  of 
Outer  Mongolia.  This  was  achieved  by  a  Russo-Chinese  decla- 
ration, signed  at  Peking  on  November  5,  1913.  Russia  recog- 
nized the  suzerainty  of  China  over  Outer  Mongolia  (Article  1), 
and  promised  not  to  keep  troops  there,  with  the  exception  of 
consular  guards.  China  in  turn  recognized  the  autonomy  of 
Outer  Mongolia  (Article  2),  agreeing  not  to  intervene  and  to 
refrain  from  further  colonization.  A  few  months  later  (Sep- 
tember 30,  1914),  Russia  signed  at  Kiakhta  with  the  Mongolian 
Government  a  new  agreement,  acquiring  a  concession  for  the 
construction  of  a  telegraph  line  which  Mongolia  had  the  right  to 
buy  from  Russia  after  the  lapse  of  thrity  years.  Upon  the  same 
day  another  agreement,  of  more  doubtful  significance,  concerning 
railroads  in  Mongolia,  was  also  signed  at  Kiakhta.  Russia  was 
to  advsie  Mongolia  as  to  the  direction,  extent  and  manner  of 
future  construction  of  railroads  (Article  2),  and  to  cooperate  If 
necessary  (Article  3). 

Japan  was  carefully  watching  the  development  of  events  In  the 
Mongolian  situation.     She  had  very  few  commercial  Interests  in 

'The  details  were  enumerated   in   a  special   Protocol,   annexed   to  the  treaty;  cf. 
MacMurray,  op.  cii.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  992-996. 


36  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Mongolia,  consequently  her  concern  was  merely  political.  Seem- 
ingly she  attached  some  importance  to  the  latter,  as  at  Peking  In 
1915  she  signed  a  special  treaty  "Respecting  South  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia."  According  to  Article  6  of  this 
treaty  China  promised  to  open  certain  ports  In  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia  for  commercial  purposes,  which  meant  the  gradual 
penetration  of  Japan  Into  the  Mongolian  markets. 

This  complicated  situation,  created  by  the  many  agreements 
between  Russia,  China  and  Mongolia,  as  well  as  by  the  final 
recognition  of  the  autonomy  of  Outer  Mongolia,  necessitated  a 
readjustment  of  the  mutual  relations  of  these  three  countries.  It 
was  achieved  in  1915  by  the  signing  at  Kiakhta  on  June  7,  of  a 
Tripartite  agreement  in  regard  to  Outer  Mongolia,  by  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Chinese  Republic,  the  Russian  Empire  and  the 
V  new  Mongolian  State.  On  January  24,  1916,  a  second  Tripartite 
agreement  settled  the  question  of  Mongolian  telegraph  lines. 
The  changes  that  took  place  In  Mongolia  thus  acquired  a  definite 
legal  form.  The  three  participants  agreed  to  the  following 
principles: 

1.  Outer  Mongolia,  though  remaining  autonomous,  recog- 
nized Chinese  suzerainty. 

2.  Treaty  power  remained  in  China's  hands,  except  for  com- 
mercial treaties  which  might  be  negotiated  directly  by  Mongo- 
lian authorities. 

3.  Russia  and  China  recognized  the  autonomy  of  Outer  Mon- 
golia, and  promised  to  abstain  from  all  Interference  with  the  in- 
ternal administration  of  the  Mongols. 

4.  No  customs  duties  were  to  exist,  either  on  Chinese  or  Rus- 
sian imports  Into  Mongolia. 

5.  Chinese  residents  were  to  be  under  Chinese  jurisdiction, 
Russians  under  Russian  jurisdiction,  while  special  mixed  courts 
were  to  be  established  for  mixed  cases,  on  the  model  of  the  former 
Russian-Chinese  mixed  courts  of  the  Russian-Chinese  Railroad. 

6.  China  promised  to  consult  Russia  on  all  political  questions 
concerning  Outer  Mongolia,  the  latter  being  practically  under  the 
joint  protection  of  Russia  and  China.' 

'The  American  Journal  of  International  Laic,  1916,  vol.  x,  p.  798,  contains  an 
exceilcnt  article  on  the  subject  by  E.  T.  Williams,  The  Relations  beizveen  China, 
Russia  and  Mongolia. 


RELATIONS  WITH  MONGOLIA 


37 


This  state  of  things,  however,  did  not  last  long,  by  reason  of 
the  collapse  of  Russia  and  of  the  advance  of  Japan  into  Siberia. 
In  1919  China,  feeling  much  stronger,  withdrew  the  autonomy  of 
Outer  Mongolia;  the  Russian  control  naturally  ceased  to  exist 
and  all  the  above-mentioned  treaties  lapsed.  But  an  entirely  new 
trouble  arose,  as  a  consequence  of  the  Russian  Civil  War.  Sev- 
eral times  the  Russians  invaded  Mongolia  and  used  Mongolian 
territory  in  their  fight  against  the  Moscow  Bolshevik  Govern- 
ment, In  1920,  Urga,  the  Mongolian  capital,  was  captured  bv 
a  Russian  independent  general  and  held  for  a  short  while.  The 
anti-Bolshevik  forces  tried  to  establish  a  strategic  base  for  them- 
selves in  Mongolia,  from  which  they  could  attack  their  Russian 
enemies.'  Later  on  Mongolia  had  to  suffer  for  yet  another  rea- 
son. The  Bolshevik  Government  endeavored  to  secure  a  way 
of  communication  with  China  and  the  outside  world  through 
Mongolia.  For  that  purpose,  not  only  did  their  agents,  with 
mails  and  goods,  use  the  Mongolian  routes  to  enter  China,  and 
spread  their  influence  and  propaganda,  but  their  generals  also 
were  ordered  to  enter  Mongolia  and  protect  these  routes,  ousting 
if  possible  the  anti-Bolshevik  forces  from  their  temporary 
strongholds.  This  they  accomplished  in  a  short  time,  getting 
practically  in  control  of  Outer  Mongolia.  This  last  summer, 
the  Bolshevik  armies  were  still  there  and  the  Moscow  Govern- 
ment made  public  in  August  their  correspondence  with  the  Mon- 
golians. The  latter  were  supposed  to  have  asked  the  Russians 
not  to  withdraw  the  Bolshevik  troops,  as  long  as  anti-Bolshevik 
forces  were  in  the  vicinity.'  Moscow  gladly  consented  to  leave 
the  troops  there,  but  promised  to  withdraw  them  as  soon  as  the 
common  enemy  should  disappear.  The  Mongolian  authorities 
are  called  by  the  Russians  "The  People's  Revolutionary  Govern- 
ment of  Mongolia."  Moscow,  however,  hints  that  this  Govern- 
ment is  not  very  firm  in  the  saddle.  Unfortunately,  one  cannot 
be  sure  that  this  is  the  final  episode  In  the  Russian-Mongolian  re- 
lations. 


^The  events  of  those  fateful  years  in  Mongolia   are  described,   for  example,  by 
Perry-Ayscough  and  Otta  Barry,  fVitli  the  Russians  in  Mongolia. 
'Cf.  Is-vesiia,  August  10  and  12,  1921. 


38  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

V.     Present  Outlook 

The  events  of  these  last  years,  the  Russian  Revolution,  the 
Civil  War  and  other  wars,  naturally  changed  and  warped  the 
whole  situation  in  the  Far  East  of  Russia.  At  the  present  day  it 
is  quite  impossible  to  say  what  the  final  outcome  may  be. 

The  revolutionary  developments  were  heralded  long  before  the 
outbreak  of  March,  1917,  by  the  gradual  weakening  of  Russia's 
influence  in  the  Far  East.  Absorbed  as  she  was  by  the  Great 
War,  she  naturally  paid  much  less  attention  to  her  outstanding 
Provinces.  Failing  and  degenerating  autocracy  was  gradually 
forced  to  abandon  all  its  imperialistic  designs  and  hopes,  whereas 
the  nation  as  a  whole  never  had  such  ambitions  and  was  always 
quite  willing  to  let  the  Far  Eastern  Districts  live  their  own  lives 
and  build  up  their  own  future.  This  attitude  was  very  much  to 
the  liking  of  the  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  Russian  population 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  from  early  days  showed  a  constantly 
growing  desire  for  a  firmly  established  self-government. 

The  local  natural  resources  are  so  great,  most  of  them  being 
yet  untouched,  the  country  on  the  whole  is  so  little  developed, 
that  there  remains  ample  room  for  expansion  without  necessity 
for  extending  political  influence  into  foreign  lands.  What  the 
Siberian  commercial  interests  wanted  and  needed  was  entrance 
into  Manchuria;  in  other  words,  the  "open  door,"  championed 
by  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  This  meant  that  terri- 
torially the  Russians  were  content  with  what  they  had  secured 
by  this  time,  viz.,  the  left  bank  of  the  Amur  River,  all  territories 
North  of  it  up  to  the  Arctic  Sea,  and  the  narrow  strip  of  land  that 
united  Vladivostok  with  Irkutsk  across  Manchuria,  along  the 
tracks  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway.  In  case  the  political  in- 
fluences were  eliminated  the  Russian  people  could  and  ought  to  be 
satisfied  with  this  situation,  which  allowed  them  to  make  use  of 
the  North  China  markets  in  a  peaceful  and  amicable  way,  with- 
out hurting  the  feelings  or  rights  of  the  Chinese.  And  on  the 
whole,  this  was  the  case.  The  Russian  people  of  the  European 
Provinces  frankly  did  not  care  about  the  Siberian  life  and  hap- 
penings. The  Siberians  themselves  were  also  quite  content,  with 
the  possible  exception  of  some  adventurous  frontiersmen  or  some 


PRESENT  OUTLOOK 


39 


/a 


quarrelsome  local  officials,  whereas  the  Central  Government, 
handicapped  by  war  and  revolution,  was  obviously  losing  its 
hold  over  the  administration  of  the  vast  Empire. 

Such  a  condition  of  domestic  and  foreign  affairs  for  China, 
seemed  to  confirm  the  farsighted  wisdom  of  Li-Hung-Chang,  who 
always  considered  the  friendly  connection  with  Russia  of  the 
greatest  possible  advantage  to  China;  the  latter  could  find  there 
a  trustworthy  friend,  ready  to  stand  by  in  case  of  a  conflict  with 
some  other  great  Power,  and  also  to  assist  her  people  in  develop- 
ing commercially  and  industrially  their  northern  market.  This 
time,  however,  the  unexpected  danger  came  from  another  quarter, 
and  was  caused  by  the  passing  aw<;iy  of  the  dying  regime  in  Russia. 
The  Tsar's  Government,  blind  to  the  signs  of  the  time,  and  deaf 
to  the  many  warnings  of  the  contemporaries,  was  going  headlong 
toward  a  national  disaster.  A  weak  and  disintegrated  Russia 
was  not  only  of  no  help  to  China,  but,  on  the  contrary,  became 
for  herself  a  menace,  creating  an  irresistible  temptation  for  other 
Powers  to  exploit  her  weakness  and  enter  her  territories  for  their 
own  imperialistic  expansion.  These  last  years  the  political  situa- 
tion of  Russia  shows  very  many  similarities  to  that  of  China. 

As  to  the  relations  of  Russia  to  Japan  since  the  beginning  of  the 
Great  War  and  up  to  the  Revolution,  we  can  see  the  same  gradual 
decline  of  Russia's  interest  in  Far  Eastern  politics,  as  described 
above.  This  meant  that  Japan,  as  time  went  on,  acquired  more 
and  more  freedom  of  action  on  the  Pacific  coast,  as  well  as  In 
the  shaping  of  her  foreign  relations  in  general.  This  Russian 
attitude  explains  for  Instance,  the  situation  and  the  meaning  from, 
he  Russian  point  of  view  of  the  secret  treaty  with  Japan,  of  July 
3,  1916.  The  Russian  nation  was  Indifferent  to  this  alliance,] 
caring  very  little  for  what  was  going  on  In  the  Far  East.  The 
European  war  was  taxing  all  the  possible  resources,  intellectual 
and  physical,  of  the  people,  and  the  revolutionary  dissatisfaction 
was  already  powerful  and  threatening,  distracting  the  Govern- 
ment to  the  utmost.  Russia's  Allies  meanwhile  were  pressing 
her  to  enter  Into  closer  cooperation  with  Japan  and  draw  the  lat- 
ter more  Into  the  European  struggle.  France  was  possibly  hop- 
ing for  material  help,  in  men,  arms  and  vessels.      England  was 


40  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

glad  to  see  a  third  party  taking  a  share  in  her  own  alliance,  which 
was  in  many  ways  creating  her  all  sorts  of  difficulties;  the  partici- 
pation of  Russia  was  seemingly  satisfying  Japan,  thus  somewhat 
mitigating  the  obligations  of  Great  Britain.  Finally,  Japan  found 
in  the  secret  alliance  of  1916  a  splendid  confirmation  of  her  most 
coveted  ambition  and  policies.  It  was  a  legal  sanction  to  her 
equality  as  a  great  Power,  opening  the  door  for  her  to  an  event- 
ual participation  in  the  final  settlements  of  the  war  on  absolutely 
equal  terms,  and  vouchsafing  her  complete  freedom  of  action  in 
the  Far  East.  The  wording  of  the  secret  treaty  of  1916  and  in 
particular  the  plural  used  in  Article  4  in  the  description  of  the 
guarantee  "given  by  its  Allies"  seems  to  show  that  the  Contract- 
ing Powers  had  only  the  Teuton  enemies  in  view,  when  they  es- 
tablished this  alliance.  The  Entente  Powers  simply  wanted  that 
Japan  should  cooperate  more  actively  in  the  war;  this  was  cer- 
tainly the  idea  that  the  Russians  had.  Though  this  treaty  was 
secret,  the  fact  of  the  conclusion  of  an  alliance  soon  leaked  out 
and  public  opinion,  as  well  as  the  Russian  press,  took  the  men- 
tioned object  of  the  alliance  for  granted  without  questioning  the 
possible  consequences.  It  is  only  later,  and  especially  now  that 
the  war  with  Germany  is  over,  that  the  aims  of  the  Japanese 
Government  and  the  significance  of  the  words  "any  third  Power 
whatsoever,  having  hostile  designs  against  Russia  or  Japan" 
(Article  1),  began  to  arouse  a  great  concern  among  certain 
nations  and  covernments. 


The  revolutionary  wave  that  broke  up  the  Tsar's  Government 
,  during  the  first  half  of  March,  1917,  took  some  time  before  it 
reached  Siberia  and  the  Far  Eastern  Provinces.  It  created  great 
joy,  as  in  the  rest  of  Russia,  among  the  Siberian  population,  but 
especially  amidst  the  political  exiles,  who  promptly  received  per- 
mission to  come  back  into  European  Russia.  During  the  months 
of  April  there  was  a  considerable  stream  of  them  returning  to 
their  homes,  and  eager  to  participate  in  the  revolution  or  as  they 
understood  it,  the  regeneration  of  Russia.  This  exodus  left 
quite  a  void  in  the  Siberian  communities,  and  deprived  the  latter 
of  a  considerable  portion  of  their  educated  forces.      Nevertheless, 


PRESENT  OUTLOOK 


41 


sufficient  enlightened  elements  were  left  to  satisfy  the  new  needs 
of  the  awakened  people,  and  thus  there  soon  became  evident  a 
strong  desire  among  the  latter  to  enlarge  further  the  principles 
and  practice  of  local  self-government.  There  never  existed  any 
question  of  separation  from  Russia  among  the  Siberians;  all  they 
wanted  was  the  establishment  of  a  distinct,  self-governing  unit, 
protected  from  the  interference  of  the  Central  Government  in 
local  affairs  and  especially  in  the  financial  administration. 

The  discussion  and  settlement  of  local  affairs  was  to  be  achieved 
by  a  Siberian  Assembly,  a  sort  of  local  Parliament  or  possiblv 
even  a  restricted  Constituent  Assembly.  Later  on  this  logically 
helped  very  much  the  formation  of  a  Regional  Government, 
which  later  still  proved  to  be  the  pivotal  point  of  the  Siberian 
struggle  against  the  Bolshevik  Government.  The  latter  was 
gradually  driving  the  anti-Bolshevik  forces  and  organizations 
out  of  European  Russia.  Thus,  in  the  autumn  of  1918  the  mem- 
bers of  the  temporary  Ufa  Government  and  the  remnants  of  the 
Pan-Russian  Constituent  Assembly  had  to  flee  Eastward  from  the 
Bolshevik  onslaught  and  very  soon  merged  at  Omsk  with  the 
Siberian  government  organization. 

In  November,  1918,  the  Koltchak  coup  followed,  replacing 
these  men  by  a  new  anti-Bolshevik  Government,  remaining  in 
power  up  to  the  autumn  of  1919  and  assuming  the  title  and  func- 
tions of  an  All-Russian  anti-Bolshevik  Government. 

Meanwhile  a  few  Czech  regiments  were  also  valiantly  fighting 
their  way  eastward,  because  the  Allies  promised  to  bring  them 
home  to  their  own  liberated  country,  on  condition  that  they  as- 
sist the  Russians  to  resist  the  bolsheviki  and  possibly  even  estab- 
lish a  new  front  against  Germany, 

The  Allies,  especially  Great  Britain  and  France,  were  endeavor- 
ing to  persuade  the  Government  of  the  United  States  also  to  par- 
ticipate actively  in  such  a  policy,  having  in  view  both  parallel  ob- 
jects, the  fight  against  Bolshevism  and  the  building  up  of  a  new 
front  against  Germany,  that  would  divert  at  least  some  of  her 
military  resources  from  the  Western  front.  Naturally  the  posi- 
tion of  Japan  in  this  matter  became  most  prominent;  the  question 
of  her  participation  had  to  be  discussed  and  her  going  into  Siberia 
in  some  form  or  other  decided  upon. 


42  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Such  were  the  transactions  between  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  during  the  summer  months  of  1918,  which  finally  culmi- 
nated in  the  decision  of  President  Wilson,  taken  in  July,  of  send- 
ing several  regiments  to  Vladivostok  and  also  agreeing  to  a  more 
active  cooperation  of  Japan.  That  such  participation  of  Japan 
should  be  admitted  is  by  no  means  strange  or  inexplicable;  on  the 
contrary,  it  was  but  natural  that  the  Japanese  should  be  asked  to 
cooperate.  They  were  the  nearest  neighbors  and  had  many 
interests  in  common,  besides  they  were  the  close  Allies  of  Russia 
and  England,  according  to  the  treaties  of  1916  and  1920,  and 
relatively  much  less  involved  in  the  European  struggle.  Their 
army  was  at  home,  ready  for  action,  and  there  existed  no  danger 
of  any  outside  attack  on  Japan,  hence  she  could  lend  a  consider- 
able part  of  her  armed  forces  for  the  allied  cause.  Moreover, 
there  is  very  good  reason  to  believe  that  at  that  time  Japan  was 
absolutely  impartial  toward  Russia,  and  had  no  idea  of  expansion 
into  Russian  territory  or  of  spreading  her  political  or  commercial 
interests  and  influences  inland  from  the  Pacific  coast.  All  this 
meant  that  under  certain  conditions  the  allied  cooperation,  with 
the  inclusion  of  Japan,  could  bring  forth  only  satisfactory  results 
for  Siberia  and  ultimately  for  Russia.  Fate,  however,  willed 
otherwise. 

According  to  the  decision  of  the  Allies  in  July,  1918,  with  the 
few  Americans,  there  were  sent  from  Japan  72,000  men,  who 
controlled  for  a  considerable  time  the  railroad  and  towns  along 
the  line  from  Vladivostok  far  into  Western  Siberia.  Already 
during  the  Koltchak  regime  of  Omsk,  there  was  felt  a  strong 
Japanese  influence  in  the  Far  Eastern  Provinces,  which  constantly 
tended  to  weaken  the  Siberian  Government.  The  most  con- 
spicuous case  was  that  of  "general"  Semenoff,  firmly  established 
in  Chita,  with  the  assistance  of  Japanese  support.  Semenoff  did 
not  wish  to  acknowledge  the  supremacy  of  Koltchak  and  in  this 
way  called  forth  two  evil  consequences  for  the  latter.  First,  by 
hampering  the  rule  of  the  Omsk  Government,  Semenoff  was  as- 
sisting the  processes  of  dismemberment  of  the  Siberian  and  Far 
Eastern  Provinces.  Secondly,  he  was  greatly  increasing  the  in- 
fluence of  Japan  in  the  same  Provinces.  Indirectly  Semenoff's 
policy  proved  to  be  detrimental  to  China.     Thus  it  happened 


PRESENT  OUTLOOK 


43 


that  with  Japanese  connivance  one  important  result  was  accom- 
plished; the  Far  Eastern  Provinces  of  the  former  Empire  of  the 
Tsar  were  split  into  two  parts,  the  distinct  line  of  demarcation 
existing  to  tiie  present  day.  It  went  North-South  across  the 
Lake  Baikal;  west  of  that  line  remained  the  Siberian  Provinces, 
at  first  with  their  own  anti-Bolshevik  Government,  but  subdued 
later  by  the  Moscow  armies.  East  of  the  line  there  crystallized 
the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  with  headquarters  at  Chita,  which  en- 
deavored to  control  the  Russian  territory  toward  the  Pacific  as 
far  as  Vladivostok,  but  with  only  sporadic  success. 


The  Western  Siberian  Provinces  at  present  live  their  own  lives, 
hardly  feeling  the  control  of  the  Central  Government  of  Mos- 
cow. Nominally,  the  Bolsheviki  still  claim  their  sovereignty. 
In  the  larger  cities,  especially  in  Irkutsk  and  Krasnoyarsk,  there 
are  very  strong  Bolshevik  organizations  playing  the  role  of  pro- 
vincial or  regional  governments,  sometimes  accepting  the  rule 
and  direction  of  Moscow,  and  sometimes  acting  absolutely  inde- 
pendently. The  enormous  distances  that  separate  Siberia  from 
Moscow  help  very  much  to  foster  such  independence.  But  off 
the  main  railroad  line  that  runs  across  Siberia,  and  especially  in 
the  rural  districts  the  Bolshevik  rule  has  no  influence  whatever 
and  really  does  not  exist.  As  in  days  of  very  primitive  culture, 
each  village,  hamlet  or  community  has  its  own  interests,  its  own 
life,  its  own  organization,  and  has  hardly  anything  to  do  with 
the  outside  world,  at  times  not  even  realizing  that  such  a  world 
exists.  The  people  live  on  their  own  produce,  being  everywhere 
overwhelmingly  agricultural.  They  can  not,  however,  improve 
their  methods  or  intensify  their  production  on  account  of  the  lack 
of  implements,  not  being  able  to  buy  new  ones  anywhere  to  re- 
place the  old  ones  now  badly  used  up.  Even  the  insignificant 
trade  with  Mongolia  or  China  has  dwindled  to  nothing.  The 
horrible  meaning  of  this  to  Russia  becomes  evident,  if  we  con- 
sider the  former  export  of  wheat  and  other  foodstuffs  from 
Siberia,  which  were  carried  out  in  such  great  quantities  that  they 
supplied  the  need  of  very  many  Russian  towns  and  in  addition 
constituted  a  large  part  of  Russia's  foreign  export.     All  foreign 


44  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

exports  stopped  long  ago,  Including  the  supply  of  foodstuffs  from 
Siberia,  which  could  have  so  easily  relieved  the  present  famine 
situation. 

In  the  Siberian  towns  of  these  Provinces  we  find  quite  a  numer- 
ous element  of  Chinese.  The  latter  have  come  In  only  lately. 
In  former  days  there  were  always  a  few  coming  over  the  border, 
but  not  often  did  they  want  to  settle  down  permanently  among 
the  Russians.  This  changed  suddenly  and  entirely  the  moment 
the  Siberian  Railway  was  opened  to  traffic.  After  1900  the 
Chinese  began  to  come  In  great  numbers,  creating  alarm  among 
many  Siberians,  who  looked  upon  this  immigration  with  great  mis- 
givings. And  many  of  the  Chinese  emigrants  seemed  to  come 
with  the  intention  of  settling  down  permanently.  Their  com- 
mercial efficiency,  their  pacific  ways,  their  great  thrift  and  ex- 
tremely small  personal  needs  made  them  formidable  competitors. 
Not  many  Russians  could  stand  competition  with  them  and  they 
looked  upon  this  Chinese  Influx  as  a  most  dangerous  form  of 
"peaceful  penetration."  The  danger  was  augmented  by  the  ex- 
ceedingly long  frontier  line,  which  could  not  be  shut  off  by  anv 
purely  physical  means.  A  backward  glance  over  this  period  dis- 
closes that,  while  alarm  was  felt  In  certain  circles,  the  local  popu- 
lation, on  the  whole,  continued  to  live  peacefully  side-by-slde  in 
towns,  like  Irkutsk,  where  Chinese  colonies  grew  to  a  consider- 
able size.  At  present  Immigration  has  ceased,  partly  because  of 
the  Russian  Civil  War  and  partly  on  account  of  China's  troubles 

with  the  Mongols. 

*  *  * 

While  the  Civil  War  was  raging  in  Siberia  and  European 
Russia,  the  Far  Eastern  Provinces  themselves  were  divided  into 
several  parts. 

First,  there  was  the  Chita  Center,  now  known  as  the  Far  East- 
ern Republic;  secondly,  came  Vladivostok  and  the  surrounding 
country,  mostly  along  the  Pacific  coast;  thirdly,  Khabarovsk  and 
the  Districts  along  the  banks  of  the  Amur,  with  a  vast,  sparsely 
inhabited  Hinterland,  stretching  as  far  as  Kamchatka;  fourthly, 
the  Russian  half  of  the  Sakhalin  Island;  and  fifthly,  the  strip  of 
land  across  Manchuria,  belonging  to  the  Chinese  Eastern  Rail- 
way. 


PRESENT  OUTLOOK  45 

From  the  times  of  Semenoff,  the  Chita  Government  Center 
was  constantly  under  the  strong  influence  of  the  Japanese.  Seme- 
noff did  not  hold  out  long  after  the  fall  of  Koltchak,  and  was  him- 
self driven  out  and  replaced  by  a  semi-Bolshevik  Government, 
which  succeeded  in  establishing  the  Far  Eastern  Republic.  This 
Republic  has  decided  Bolshevik  leanings,  and  often  accepted  the 
political  guidance  of  Moscow,  but  on  the  whole  maintained  its 
individuality  and  independence,  and  at  times  even  showed  a  pro- 
nounced tendency  toward  further  expansion.  Its  object  in  this 
respect  was  to  get  the  control  of  Vladivostok;  the  regions  along 
the  Amur  interested  Chita  very  little  and  could  be  only  a  "route" 
or  an  opening  further  East.  The  Manchurian  Railway  was  out 
of  their  reach,  neither  the  Japanese,  nor  the  Chinese  being  will- 
ing to  give  the  line  over  to  the  Russians  of  any  political  creed 
whatsoever.  So  the  coveted  opening  for  Chita  was  Vladivostok, 
which  would  have  meant  a  doorway  to  the  outside  world.  But 
Vladivostok  was  not  so  easy  to  get,  because  of  the  distance  sepa- 
rating it  from  Chita,  and  on  account  of  quite  different  Japanese 
interests  there,  and  also  because  the  Russians  of  the  Maritime 
Province  were  by  no  means  ready  to  accept  the  Chita  rule.  How- 
ever, the  Far  Eastern  Republic  did  advance  successfully  along  the 
Amur  and  Is  controlling  at  present  this  region  as  far  as  Khaba- 
rovsk. It  finally  succeeded  In  ousting  the  Japanese,  defeating 
the  White  anti-Bolshevik  generals  who  tried  to  advance  from 
Mongolia,  and  achieved  a  certain  stability  of  local  administration. 
It  lives  in  peace  westward  and  has  friendly  relations  with  the 
Bolshevik  group  in  control  of  Irkutsk,  being  also  in  constant  com- 
munication with  the  Government  of  Moscow.  Chita  evidently 
considers  itself  independent  from  the  Moscow  Government, 
though  the  latter  has  not  ceased  hoping  to  control  it  eventually. 
The  political  color  of  the  Chita  Government  Is  decidedly  radi- 
cal, though  not  communistic.  There  are  a  few  bolsheviki  in  the 
Government,  but  they  do  not  have  command  of  the  situation  at 
all.  Socialists  of  other  denominations  are  more  Influential  and 
the  bourgeois  element  is  not  excluded. 

The  recent  transactions  between  this  Government  and  the 
Japanese  at  Dairen  have  one  object  In  view;  i.  e.,  the  evacuation 
of  Vladivostok  by  the  Japanese.      In  Chita  and  the  Transbalkal 


46  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Districts  the  Japanese  are  no  more  to  be  seen;  most  of  them  have 
gone  home  of  their  own  accord,  having  found  the  sentiment  of 
the  local  people  unfriendly,  but  they  still  control  the  Pacific  coast 
from  Vladivostok,  on  which  the  Chita  Government  laid  their 
eyes  long  ago.  At  present  the  Chita  representatives  are  trying 
to  convince  the  Japanese  of  the  necessity  of  evacuating  Vladivos- 
tok as  well,  which  would  give  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  the  chance 
to  occupy  the  Maritime  Province,  destroy  the  local  anti-Bolshe- 
vik Government  there,  and  thus  get  rid  of  their  last  opponent  in 
the  Far  East  and  acquire  at  the  same  time  an  outlet  to  the  sea. 
The  Japanese  policy  in  the  matter  is  not  yet  clear  and  probably 
depends  on  entirely  different  factors,  the  European  and  Ameri- 
can policies  included. 

The  country  north  of  the  Amur,  the  District  of  Yakutsk  and 
the  Kamchatka  peninsula  are  in  a  somewhat  different  position. 
The  Moscow  Government  never  was  willing  to  lose  Yakutsk  and 
Kamchatka  on  account  of  their  tremendous,  though  yet  quite  un- 
explored natural  resources.  The  Bolsheviki  always  hoped  to  be 
able  to  exploit  these  regions,  by  granting  concessions  to  for- 
eigners. The  most  conspicuous  case  is  the  grant  of  a  huge  con- 
cession to  Washington  Vanderlip.  The  trouble  with  such  con- 
cessions, however,  is  the  lack  of  assurance,  legal  and  political, 
that  such  grants  will  retain  their  value  in  case  a  change  of  govern- 
ment occurs  in  Russia.  The  indications  are  that  no  new  govern- 
ment, whatever  its  political  form  or  doctrine,  will  be  willing  or 
able  to  recognize  the  validity  of  the  Bolshevik  grants. 

The  ease  with  which  the  nominal  control  of  Moscow  could  still 
maintain  itself  in  Yakutsk  and  Kamchatka,  is  explained  by  the 
great  indifference  of  the  Russian  people  toward  these  far-away 
regions  which  hold  for  them  no  political  significance  whatever. 

Most  of  the  inhabited  centers  and  hamlets  are  likewise  living 
their  own  lives,  not  caring  for  the  outside  world.  Many  of  them 
went  through  a  stage  of  Bolshevik  rule,  instituted  and  dominated 
by  local  men.  Along  the  northern  coast  of  the  Pacific,  the  Japan- 
ese played  an  important  role,  because  of  the  fisheries.  Japan  is 
very  much  interested  in  acquiring  full  control  of  the  fisheries, 
which  have  an  immense  economic  value,  by  reason  of  the  inex- 
haustible supply  of  fish.      During  the  Tsar's  regime,  Japan  made 


PRESENT  OUTLOOK 


47 


an  effort  to  secure  for  herself  these  fisheries;  she  tried  to  get  them 
at  Portsmouth,  in  1905,  and  acquired  several  privileges  by  the 
subsequent  conventions  with  Russia.  She  is  now  endeavoring  to 
establish  her  exclusive  control  over  them/ 


48 


RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 


means  pleased  with  their  surroundings  on  Russian  territory  and 
in  consequence  will  hardly  stay  there  forever.  The  main  reasons 
are :  first,  the  cold  and  trying  climate  of  this  country  which  the 
Japanese  cannot  stand  at  all  and  which  makes  permanent  resi- 
dence impossible  for  them;  secondly,  their  policy  in  the  Far  East 


"STrN    CIRCULAIIONULPARTAAENT 

loaFTperIod  1   l2 
HOAAE  ySE^ , 

4  ' 


FORM  NO.  DD6 


BERKELEY,  CA  94720 


(g>s 


